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ABSTRACT
What do individual motives and organizational factors have to do with individuals
from public charities joining and participating in child-focused advocacy coalitions? A
mail survey of members of child-focused advocacy coalitions in California was
conducted in order to investigate the correlation between incentives for joining advocacy
coalitions and level of advocacy activity. The study also examined the relationships
among incentives and level of advocacy activity and other factors, including role in the
coalition, job function, official duty, and organizational size. Four hundred surveys were
mailed, yielding a final valid response rate of 36.8%.
The study found that strategic incentives, such as bringing about social change to
benefit others and expressing important personal values, were the most influential
incentives behind members' decisions to join advocacy coalitions, particularly for core
members, whereas resource development incentives, such as protesting cuts or generating
revenue, were the weakest influences on decisions to join. The results showed that
strategic incentives had the highest positive correlation with action, followed by
fellowship incentives, such as networking with colleagues, and then resource
development incentives. The study also found strong positive correlations among
incentives to join and incentives to remain, along with a significant increase over time in
resource development incentives. Finally, coalition members without advocacy in their
job description were significantly more motivated to remain with advocacy coalitions by
fellowship incentives than subjects with advocacy in their job description. It is
recommended that coalition leaders direct their attention towards assessing and nurturing
strategic and fellowship incentives within the coalitions.

iv

VITA AUCTORIS
Name

Kevin Hickey

Date ofBirth

August 6, 1968

High School

Susquehanna Township High School
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Graduated

1986

Baccalaureate Degree

Bachelor of Arts, Psychology

College

San Francisco State University
San Francisco, California

Graduated

1997

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I must first thank the subjects of the study. Without their participation it would
not have been possible. I also owe a deep debt of gratitude to the advocacy coalitions
who entrusted me with their coveted membership lists. I was certainly fortunate to be
guided by patient, knowledgeable, and experienced advisors. My thanks go to Elizabeth
Reid at the Urban Institute, for sharing her deep understanding of advocacy coalitions and
children's organizations. Her assistance was especially invaluable as I launched this study
and positioned it with consideration of existing knowledge. Thanks, too, to Michael
O'Neill at the University of San Francisco, for his precise and wise suggestions. Without
a doubt, the quality of this study was tremendously enhanced through his feedback. And
thanks to Carol Silverman at the University of San Francisco, for giving me the research
and statistics tools, along with a regular dose of encouragement, to undertake this
endeavor. Finally, I owe so much to my partner, Valerie Weak, whose unwavering
support and love provided me a foundation upon which I could successfully accomplish
the challenges of growth.

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1

Summary of Coalition Membership ...................................... .41

Table 2

Most and Least Influential Reasons to Join Coalitions ................ .42

Table 3

Means oflncentives to Join Coalitions .................................. .44

Table 4

Correlations Between Incentives to Join Coalitions and Action ...... 45

Table 5

Stepwise Regression Analysis of Incentives to Join Coalitions ...... 46

Table 6

Summary of Coalition Roles and Mean Scores for Action ........... .47

Table 7

Crosstabulation of Coalition Roles and Action ......................... 48

Table 8

Summary of Reported Budget Sizes ...................................... 50

Table 9

Crosstabulation of Budget Size and Action .............................. 51

Table 10

Most and Least Influential Reasons to Remain in Coalitions ......... 52

Table 11

Means oflncentives to Remain in Coalitions ........................... 53

Table 12

Correlations Between Incentives to Join and Incentives to
Remain in Coalitions ........................................................ 54

Table 13

Paired Sample T-tests oflncentives to Join Coalitions
to Incentives to Remain in Coalitions .................................... 55

Table 14

Summary of Frequency of Receiving Action Alerts .................... 56

Table 15

Advocacy Tactics Most Frequently Requested and Conducted,
Most Frequently Requested and Not Conducted,
and Most Frequently Not Requested ...................................... 57

Table 16

Crosstabulation of Role and Strategic Incentives to Join Coalitions 59

Table 17

Independent Samples T-tests of Advocacy as an Official Duty
to Incentives .................................................................. 60

Table 18

Independent Samples T-tests ofPrimary Job Function to Incentives61

Table 19

Correlations Between Staff Size and Incentives ........................ 62

Table 20

Correlations Between Budget Size and Incentives ..................... 63

vii

LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix A

Survey Instrument ............................................................ 87

Appendix B

Initial Introductory Cover and Consent Letter ........................... 92

Appendix C

Follow-up Postcard .......................................................... 93

Appendix D

Final Introductory Cover and Consent Letter ............................ 94

viii

INTRODUCTION
Children need a voice in our political system. We, adults, parents, caregivers,
healthcare providers, teachers, who care about them have to ensure there are
programs and services to take care of them and that the government
continues/begins to consider their best interests in planning and spending.
(Subject 304)

As of2002, approximately 72.8 million children under age 18 were living in the
United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003). Considering the great number of children in
America, we need to muster significant resources to ensure that they remain safe and
healthy, succeed in school, and contribute to the development and vitality of their
communities. Because children are undoubtedly underrepresented in the democratic
process, advocacy on behalf of children is urgently needed to meet the critical needs of
one of our nation's most dependent and vulnerable populations. Among the important
resources available to conduct advocacy on behalf of children are the service providers
that children encounter every day in public charities. All across America, health,
education, housing, family, and employment professionals, among others, dedicate
countless hours of service to children.
But many professionals from across the spectrum of service provision create an
even larger role for themselves. In addition to their responsibilities at their respective
public charities, they also engage in advocacy. As the National Association of Social
Workers' Code of Ethics, Section 6.04(a), states, "social workers should be aware ofthe
impact of the political arena on practice and should advocate for changes in policy and
legislation in order to meet basic human needs and promote social justice" (quoted in
Schneider and Lester, 2001, p. 74). Service providers from the nonprofit sector have a
long history of embracing the dual roles of charity and advocacy (Schneider and Lester,
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2001). For example, in the late nineteenth century, Hull House Settlement workers led by
Jane Addams (1938) successfully lobbied the Illinois legislature to enact protections for
child workers. Today's charity workers continue this rich tradition of advocacy. On
behalf of children, they strive to influence public policies through a variety of advocacy
activities such as lobbying, media outreach, and constituent mobilization. Their deep
understanding of children's issues adds valuable knowledge to advocacy efforts. As
Berry (2001, p. 5) noted, "for congressional staffers and agency policymakers, expertise
is the coin of the realm, and those who want to lobby them need to use the same
currency." Moreover, Roberts-DeGennaro (1986a, p. 308) reported that "studies have
suggested that the most important variable in the legislative and budgetary priorities
given to social welfare programs is the presence of a community organization that can
lobby successfully for these programs." Fortunately, these important advocates do not
stand alone in their efforts; they unite through coalitions.
Coalitions are groups of individuals and organizations working together on issues
of common interest (McKay, 2001 ). Coalitions are not ends in themselves; they are
"strategic devices to enhance the leverage of various organizations" (Roberts-DeGennaro,
1986a, p. 309). Coalitions serve as a driving force to help communicate common goals
and promote collective action. In fact, studies have shown that coalitions are a necessary
and effective vehicle for advocacy on behalf of children (Kinley, 1986; Surgalla, 1984).
In response to social conditions, such as the concentration of poverty in inner-city areas,
"a wide-array of local partnerships that aim to mobilize significant action on behalf of
young people converge on certain core values, assumptions, and operating principles ...
to change an array of existing beliefs, work habits, resource priorities, and
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institutionalized relationships" (Briggs, 2001, p. 6). For example, in California, the Kern
County Network for Children brings together service agencies, residents, and local
businesses to identify children's needs, find resources, and engage policymakers (Action
Alliance for Children, 2002). Kern County Network for Children's efforts have improved
children's lives: both infant death rates and high school drop-out rates have declined,
while other indicators, such as immunization rates and school attendance, have improved.
America is a nation of joiners, individuals "who for whatever reason choose to
'combine in order to act'" (Schlesinger, 1949, p. 25). But why do individuals choose to
join child-focused advocacy coalitions? Some join to express important personal values.
Others join to provide altruistic service or social change for the benefit of others. Still
others might join to associate with like-minded individuals or to network with colleagues.
Finally, some join to foster or maintain the financial health of their organizations, such as
by protesting cuts or generating revenue. Overall, there is a great deal of variability in
motives that drive people and groups. Equally importantly, variability in motives is
related to differences in behavior; some reasons for joining advocacy coalitions are
stronger motivators than others. Yet the success of advocacy coalitions is fundamentally
dependent upon the behavior of their members. Coalition members must heed the call to
action, that is, must act upon messages that urge advocacy, such as writing Congress in
support of a piece of legislation. Without action, coalitions like the Kern County Network
for Children could not engage policymakers on behalf of children. But if different
motives are tied to different behaviors, how does this impact heeding the call to action?
Are some incentives -

for instance, financial rewards - more powerful motivators to

advocacy than others, such as personal values? While a number of factors likely impact
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coalition members' willingness and ability to heed the call to action, this study examined
a key factor in all behavior: the motives behind it. Why do individuals from public
charities join child-focused advocacy coalitions? Is there an association between
particular reasons for joining advocacy coalitions and responsiveness to calls to action?
How do organizational factors, such as staff size, budget size, job function, and official
duties impact heeding the call?
This study was important for several reasons. First of all, nonprofit organizations
have historically performed a central role in America's civic engagement and democracy
(O'Neill, 2002; Reid, 2000). The First Amendment established the foundations of
advocacy: the freedom of speech and the rights to peaceably assemble and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances. In nineteenth-century America, factors such as
ethnic and religious diversity, urbanization, humanitarian motivations, and economic and
political changes, converged creating a deluge of new voluntary associations (O'Neill,
2002). More than a century later, in the 1970s, nonprofit organizations had become even
more pervasive in America, and the prominent Filer Commission conducted a thorough
examination of the scope and roles of the nonprofit sector (Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs, 1975). The commission affirmed the role of nonprofit
organizations in shaping and advancing public policy. Equally importantly, the
commission concluded that "the monitoring and influencing of government may be
emerging as one of the single most important and effective functions of the private
nonprofit sector" (p. 45). Certainly such broad validation warranted investigation into the
current nature of nonprofit child-focused advocacy coalitions.
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Next, troubling information on the health and well-being of children supported the
need for this research as well. Childhood poverty remains a critical problem. Poverty has
long-lasting negative effects on the safety, health, and education of children. Figures on
child poverty should raise alarms. In 2000, 16.1% of children under age 18 lived below
the poverty threshold (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001a). In California that year, the rate was
19.2% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001b). Data on education add to the concerns; results from
California's STAR standardized testing fueled worries about the prospects for many
children. A troubling 39% of all 11th grade students rated below basic, or worse, on
English/Language arts, while students receiving special education services attained a
dismal3% proficiency score (California Department of Education, 2002). Even the
environment itself endangers children. Nationally, 18.5% of children in 2001lived in
areas that did not meet one or more of the Primary National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics, 2003, Table
POP9 .A, p. 86). Yet large numbers of children did not have health insurance. In
California in 2001, about 1.3 million children under age 18 lacked health insurance or
experienced gaps in coverage (Children Now, 2003). Taken together, this information
suggests that the status of children is linked to their underrepresentation in the democratic
process. Children do not vote; their voices are easily ignored, if heard at all. Service
providers acting through advocacy coalitions speak for children, guard their interests, and
promote their health and well-being. There was a vital need to support these efforts
through research.
This study was also needed because there is a dearth of information about
advocacy by nonprofit organizations (Krehely, 2001; McCarthy and Castelli, 2001; Reid,
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2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001 ). De Vita, Mosher-Williams, and Stengel (200 1)
reported that "very little information is available on the number, types, geographic
distribution, or financial resources of nonprofit groups that direct their attention to
children and child advocacy issues" (p. 4). This was particularly true for public interest
coalitions (Hula, 1999). Additionally, while advocacy included a wide range of ideas and
activities, few people agreed on what it actually meant (Ezell, 1994; McCarthy and
Castelli, 2001; Reid, 2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001 ). Persistent definitional problems
and a general dearth of information sounded a call for more research.
Finally, strengthening the capacity of child-focused advocacy coalitions is key to
building a stronger voice for children; this served as the ultimate rationale for the study.
Too many calls to action are left unheeded, weakening the collective force of childfocused advocacy coalitions. In order to get the most action from available resources, it is
critical that nonprofit leaders understand the motivations of the human resources at their
disposal. But sound human resource management cannot take place without relevant
information on the current and potential human resources (Pynes, 1997). This study
aimed to support leaders at advocacy coalitions by providing current information on the
motivations and advocacy activities oftheir members. Managers, advocates, funders, and
policymakers can all use these findings to support child advocacy. With such knowledge
at hand, the ability of leaders to improve the rates of response by coalition members to
calls to action would be enhanced, furthering public policy engagement and fostering
safer, healthier, more successful lives for children.
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CHAPTER ONE: REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND DELINIATION OF PROBLEM
This chapter summarizes the principal theoretical and research literature relevant
to the topic. Specifically, it covers key definitions, related literature, delineation of
hypotheses and exploratory research questions, and the study's anticipated contributions
to the field.
Key Definitions
Public Charities. For the purposes of this study, public charities were defined as
nonprofit organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) ofthe Internal Revenue Code.
Public charities include human and social service groups, hospitals and healthcare
organizations, religious groups, arts organizations, educational institutions, advocacy
groups, and others.
Advocacy. Advocacy is not synonymous with lobbying. Advocacy encompasses a
wide range of concepts and activities commonly linked to influencing the policymaking
processes of government (Reid, 2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001 ), while lobbying
typically refers to a narrower set of activities directed at legislators. In fact, with regards
to public charities, the IRS limits its classification of advocacy to grassroots lobbying,
meaning attempts to influence legislation by affecting public opinion, or direct lobbying,
meaning attempts to influence legislation through communication with legislators or
government officials participating in the formulation of legislation (Adler, 1999).
Schneider and Lester (2001) described a number ofkey dimensions of advocacy,
including speaking on behalf of another, taking action, promoting change, and securing
social justice. Reid (2000) suggested yet another important dimension of advocacy: the
notion of collective action. Groups of people unite and act around common causes.
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Where action is concerned, a range of activities fall under the heading of advocacy,
including public education, research, constituent mobilization, policy design, and
lobbying, along with litigation, public demonstrations, and coalition building, among still
others (McCarthy and Castelli, 2001; Reid, 2000). To all intents and purposes, no one
really agrees on what advocacy actually means (Ezell, 1994; McCarthy and Castelli,
2001; Reid, 2000; Schneider and Lester, 2001). To take only two examples, Jenkins
( 1987, p. 297) broadly defined advocacy "as any attempt to influence the decisions of any
institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest," while Polier ( 1977, p. 497)
characterized child advocacy in particular "as an effort to challenge and change systems
that are injurious to children, that are inadequate to prevent harm, or that provide
inappropriate help to children" (p. 497).
For the purposes of this study, advocacy was defined as an action that attempts to
influence the proposed or actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities.
There were a few key elements to this definition. Action meant actually doing something,
moving beyond interest and intentions to effort. Furthermore, these actions were an
attempt to exert influence, whether or not successful in outcome. Finally, the influence
was aimed at the proposed or actual policies of government, which covered deliberations
and decisions on, and implementation or practice of, these policies.

Action Alert. Communication is the foundation of action. Through
communications commonly known as action alerts, advocacy organizations call their
members to action. Action alerts urge group members to conduct advocacy, typically
around a particular issue. For example, the National Youth Advocacy Coalition (NYAC)
has sent action alerts by email to its members that, on more than one occasion,
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"contributed to the ability of youth and their advocates to have their voices heard"
(Carey, 1996, p. 9). NYAC action alerts have encouraged "youth, teachers, parents, and
service providers to send in written testimony" to Congress about antigay Congressional
activities (p. 9).
For the purposes of this study, an action alert was defined as a message urging
group members to conduct advocacy. There were a few key elements to this definition.
First, it did not restrict action alerts to any particular mode of delivery. Email, faxes,
postal mailings, phone calls, and face-to-face communications all fell within its
parameters. Additionally, action alerts urged advocacy action on a particular issue; they
went beyond general encouragement to participate in the group's activities. Furthermore,
action alerts did not necessarily specify a particular advocacy tactic. It was assumed,
however, that most of the time they did suggest a particular form of action, as the NYAC
example demonstrates.

Advocacy Coalition. Coalitions are generally thought of as structured groups of
individuals or organizations that come together to work on issues of common interest
(McKay, 2001). "Coalitions provide a mechanism through which very separate and
diverse organizations can cooperate and work together around a common goal" (RobertsDeGennnaro, 1986b, p. 248). Coalitions exist for a variety of reasons, including
providing services, sharing information, conducting research and analysis, enhancing
fundraising, or undertaking advocacy. Berry ( 1977) suggested that coalitions were
structured along two dimensions: permanence and participation. Some coalitions are
temporary alliances that meet only occasionally, with participation and resources possibly
dependent on only one member. Other coalitions are more enduring and participatory, but
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they "do not lend themselves to institutionalized or permanent arrangements" (Berry,
1977, p. 258). However, still other coalitions, which Berry (1977) characterized as
"independent coalitions," may last for years and have staff, offices, and a distinct identity
separate from its members.
For the purposes of this study, advocacy coalition was defined as a collection of
organizational representatives working together through a unifying agency to influence
the proposed or actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities. There were
some key elements to this definition. Coalitions in the study that met this definition had
separate staff, offices, and function from any of their members and operated with separate
public and legal identities. Additionally, the primary purpose of the coalition was
advocacy. Some scholars would label this type of coalition an interest group. As Berry
(2003, p. 27) noted, "the general rule ofthumb among scholars is that if it lobbies, it's an
interest group." Examples include Children Now in Oakland, California or the Children's
Initiative in San Diego.

Member. For the purposes of this study, member was defined as an individual
carried on an advocacy coalition's contact list for action alerts. It was assumed that the
members were individuals primarily representing their employer, with the sanction of
their employer for participation, as opposed to autonomous individuals or organizations
as members. It was also assumed that the members' incentives reflected a mixture of
individual and organizational motives.

Children. For the purposes of this study, children were defined as people aged
zero through eighteen. This definition encompasses a range of populations commonly
known as infants, children, and youth.
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Review of Literature
A discussion of forces that impact participation in advocacy begins with an
examination of the role of organizational capacity. As Berry (2003, p. 124) stated, "the
beginning point in understanding an organization's political ability is to ask simply, if a
bit crudely, 'How much do they have?"' A number of studies have investigated this
question. First, Krehely (2001) evaluated financial reports from agencies from across the
spectrum of charities. He found that, comparatively speaking, larger organizations more
typically reported lobbying expenses (Krehely, 2001). Similarly, De Vita et al. (2001)
conducted an examination of child-focused nonprofits. Like Krehely, they also found that
larger organizations were more likely to report lobbying expenditures than smaller
agencies (De Vita et al., 2001). Findings from the Strengthening Nonprofit Advocacy
Project (2002), a national research project by OMB Watch, Tufts University, and Charity
Lobbying in the Public Interest, supported these conclusions as well. This project found
that both budget size and staff size were significant predictors of public policy
participation (Strengthening Nonprofit Advocacy Project, 2002). Agencies with annual
expenses of $1 million or more were significantly more likely to participate in public
policy activities than agencies with less than $1 million in expenses, and as the number of
staff increased, organizations participated more in public policy as well (Strengthening
Nonprofit Advocacy Project, 2002). Lobbying requires a substantial commitment of
human and financial resources, which inhibits smaller organizations from participating in
the legislative process (De Vita et al., 2001). In general, more resources lead to more
advocacy.
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Two other organizational factors have been shown to be related to participation in
advocacy: job function and official duty. Ezell (1991) found that administrators and
supervisors were more likely than direct-service staff members to set aside time for
advocacy. This is consistent with the nature of advocacy as an external function. As part
of their job function, administrators and supervisors are more responsible for activities
external to the organization. Similarly, Ezell (1994) discovered that official duties had
significant implications for the amount of advocacy conducted by social workers, with
those officially assigned to conduct advocacy performing more advocacy than those not
officially assigned to so. He found that more than 50% of social workers who reported
that advocacy was part of their official duties engaged in five or more hours of advocacy
per week, while only 2% of those who said that advocacy was not part of their official
duties performed that much advocacy. From Ezell's two studies it appeared that both job
function and official duties impacted participation in advocacy. However, these
organizational factors do not alone account for differences in participation in advocacy:
Underlying motivations play an important role too.
Motivation is a hypothetical construct used to explain variations in behavior. Why
do some individuals work harder than others? Motivation relates to voluntary behavior,
not instinctive behavior nor involuntary action (Beck, 1983). Motivation cannot be seen,
but it is assumed to exist. Researchers rely on theories to guide them towards its
measurable manifestations (Pinder, 1984). As Herzberg (1990) asserted, "the psychology
of motivation is tremendously complex, and what has been unraveled with any degree of
assurance is small indeed" (p. 49). It is beyond the scope of this investigation to present
an exhaustive discussion on motivation. Rather, this section will first briefly summarize
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the basic philosophies on motivation in the workplace, then highlight the findings of
some influential authors on motivation, and finally review the role that incentives play in
advocacy coalitions.
Beck (1983) suggested that there were four basic philosophies on motivation in
the workplace. These viewpoints had influenced how managers thought and how they
dealt with their workers.
•

"Rational-economic": the assumption that only economic forces motivated
individuals, and that workers made rational decisions based on financial
considerations.

•

"Social": that workers were primarily motivated by social needs.

•

"Self-actualizing": that individuals were intrinsically motivated; that feelings of
pride, satisfaction, and the work itself drove behavior.

•

"Complex": that there was "a great variability in motives, emotions, experiences,
and abilities of different people and that these change[ d] over time" (Beck, 1983,
p. 3 78; italics in original).
Maslow's (1970) "need hierarchy" theory certainly influenced many discussions

on motivation. Maslow argued that psychological and physiological needs underpinned
motivation and behavior. He structured needs in a hierarchy, starting at the lowest level
with the physiological needs, such as food, then moving up through needs for safety, love
and belonging, esteem, and finally to the need for self-actualization, that is, selffulfillment in finding one's calling. Lower-level needs would drive behavior until they
were satisfied. Once satisfied, though, they would no longer drive behavior and the
individual would become motivated to satisfy higher-level needs. However, theories on
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motivation and behavior must account for levels and force; most behavior results from a
combination of needs from varying levels and with differing degrees of intensity
(Maslow, 1970).
Pinder (1984) argued that there were two human factors related to productivity in
the workplace: employee ability and employee motivation. He defined work motivation
as "a set of energetic forces that originate both within as well as beyond an individual's
being to initiate work related behaviors, and to determine its form, direction, intensity,
and duration" (p. 8). These forces consisted of a mixture of needs, desires, and external
factors. Vroom (1995) described several forces likely to impact motivation. First, people
worked to gain wages. "Although economic factors undoubtedly play an important role in
the decision to work, it is highly improbable that they are the only inducements" (p. 37).
Additionally people wanted to expend mental or physical energy. Conditions did exist
where action was preferred to idleness. People worked to contribute to the production of
goods and services, to fulfill moral purposes, and to experience social interactions and
fellowship. Finally, social status influenced motivation in the workplace, because "a
person's occupation greatly influences the way in which other people respond to him
outside the work situation" (p. 48). Vroom asserted that motivation in the workplace was
a confluence of these forces and the choices individuals made were based on the
probability that particular efforts would lead to particular, valuable outcomes. As the
expectation of valuable outcomes increased, so effort would increase.
Barnard (1938) asserted that organizations brought about the actions of
individuals through the range of incentives they provided. Material incentives, such as
money or other physical things, were provided as inducements for service or reward for
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contributions. However, he believed, personal, non-material incentives, for example,
opportunities for prestige or distinction, played a more important role than material
incentives. Desirable physical conditions at work, associational attractiveness, and the
opportunity for participation in important events also served as inducements. But one of
the most powerful incentives was ideal benefaction: the "capacity of organizations to
satisfy personal ideals usually relating to non-material, future, or altruistic relations" (p.
146). Examples included loyalty, patriotism, pride of workmanship, and altruistic service
for family or others. Political organizations could not survive without the capacity to
satisfy these personal, altruistic ideals. Finally, the condition of communion, which
Barnard described as the "opportunity for comradeship, for mutual support in personal
attitudes" (p. 148), completed his inventory of incentives. He pointed out that personal
motives were neither a universal attribute nor a steady-state function. "Different men are
moved by different incentives or combinations of incentives and by different incentives
or combinations at different times" (p. 148).
Yet even given the great variability and dynamic nature of incentives, Clark and
Wilson (1961) claimed that the "incentive system may be regarded as the principal
variable affecting organizational behavior" (p. 130). They categorized incentives as well,
emphasizing that particular incentives impacted people differently and that changes in the
economy, distribution of resources, morals, expectations, and attitudes transformed
personal motives over time. Material incentives were "rewards that have a monetary
value or can be easily translated into ones that have" (p. 134). Solidary incentives
originated from "socializing, congeniality, [and] the sense of group membership and
identification" (p. 134). Solidary incentives tended to exist independently of the goals of
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the organization. On the other hand, purposive incentives were primarily derived from the
goals of the organization. Organizational members were motivated by efforts to alter the
status quo on behalf of nonmembers, for example "the demand for the enactment of
certain laws or the adoption of certain practices (which do not benefit the members in any
direct tangible way)" (p. 135; italics in original). The value of the goals themselves
motivated effort. Nevertheless, Clark and Wilson believed that for purposive
organizations, such as advocacy groups, "fewer people are willing to accept
organizational purposes as a primary incentive than are willing to accept material or
solidary inducements" (p. 151 ).
Herzberg (1990), however, argued, "It is only when one has a generator of one's
own that we can talk about motivation. One then needs no outside stimulation. One wants
to do it" (p. 52; italics in original). Intrinsic motivators, such as the work itself,
responsibility, and growth led to job satisfaction and increased motivation. On the other
hand, separate and distinct extrinsic factors, such as company policies, interpersonal
relationships, working conditions, and salary, were the primary sources of job
dissatisfaction and could reduce motivation. Herzberg proposed that job enrichment,
through increases in responsibility, opportunities for personal achievement, recognition,
and growth, led to job satisfaction and motivation. While the aforementioned authors
provided valuable insight on motivation that can be applied to an examination of
participation in advocacy coalitions, other authors addressed this topic more directly.
In his exchange theory of interest groups Salisbury (1969, p. 2) postulated that the
"origins, growth, death, and associated lobby activity" of interest groups could be
explained by an exchange relationship between interest group entrepreneurs and
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prospective members. Interest group entrepreneurs, the organizers, leaders, and initiators
of the group, offered a mixture of incentives to potential members at a set price:
membership, which might range in practice from a supportive signature to heavy dues.
Salisbury conceptualized both material and solidary incentives as described by Clark and
Wilson. But rather than purposive benefits, which were derived primarily from
organizational goals, he preferred the notion of expressive benefits. These benefits
provided mechanisms for the public expression of values, and people were willing to join
groups primarily to express their values.
Essentially, the exchange theory asserted that in order for interest groups to
remain viable, there must be a mutually satisfactory exchange between the potential
member and the entrepreneur (Salisbury, 1969). For the potential member, if the
incentives warranted the price of membership, then they joined the interest group,
satisfied, while at the same time, the entrepreneurs' incentives must maintain the
necessary flow ofbenefits to their group. If the incentives failed to attract sufficient
membership at the set price, or the price failed to keep the group solvent, then the interest
group collapsed. Basically, the success of the organization depended on the quality of the
entrepreneurship. Group leaders must find the appropriate balance between incentives
and price. Salisbury's exchange theory held that group members were willing to give in
exchange for an incentive. However, Salisbury's members were generally limited to
donors and dues payers. While these types of member were certainly important to interest
groups, Hula ( 1999) applied the exchange theory to members' actions beyond the
exchange point of joining a group.
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Hula ( 1999) argued that the incentives motivating a group to join a coalition
strongly influenced the role the group played within the coalition once they joined. More
specifically, he contended that differences in coalition members' work levels were
closely correlated with the reasons why the members had joined the coalition. Hula
divided coalition members into the three groups: core members, specialists (or players),
and peripheral (or tag-along) members. Core members were coalition founders and other
resource-rich groups that typically brokered the initial emergence of the coalition or
joined a coalition to achieve strategic policy goals. Motivated to bring about strategic
victory, core groups carried out a high level of coalition work towards the overall goal.
They were "generally willing to commit time and effort to carrying the coalition's
platform into battle" (p. 50). Specialists also joined coalitions to achieve policy goals, but
their reasons for joining were tactical: rather than pursuing broad strategic goals,
specialist groups sought to include their particular goals in the coalition's platform and
insert specific provisions within the legislation at hand. Their work level and "lobbying
efforts in the legislative arena ... tend to be focused on their specific piece ofthe issue or
legislation rather than the package as a whole" (p. 44). Lastly, peripheral groups joined
coalitions for non-policy incentives, such as information or benefits related to symbolic
participation in the coalition. While generally supportive of the coalition's goals,
peripheral groups lacked a "willingness to expend significant resources to achieve the
eventual policy goal that serves as the focus of the coalition" (p. 46). These groups
typically maintained a low work level for coalition activities. As Hula summed it up, not
all of the coalition members in his study were interested in getting a bill passed: "the core
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members wanted the bill [passed]; the players wanted a paragraph; and the peripheral
groups wanted a picture for their newsletter" (p. 135).
Hula ( 1999) also recognized the dynamic characteristics of motives, noting that a
group's position within a coalition and their corresponding level of work might change
over time. For instance, as the particular goals of a coalition shifted, groups may move
back and forth from the positions of specialist and peripheral as the relevance of the
issues to their organizations and constituents waxed and waned. Furthermore, core
members were not limited to founders and other resource rich groups. "Other groups may
become core members if they have strong commitment to the overall coalition goal and
are willing to devote time, energy, and other resources to coalition work" (p. 43).
Notwithstanding the general dearth of studies of the role that incentives play in
participation in advocacy coalitions, some studies touched upon this topic. First, Berry's
(1977) study found that membership services and publications were not important
incentives and that the role of solidary incentives varied greatly even within single
organizations. Berry ( 1977) also concluded that "purposive incentives are the most
important type of incentives for public interest groups" (p. 42). These incentives "make it
possible for most public interest groups to operate" (p. 43). Next, Weisner's (1983)
analysis of the coalition building process for human service agencies in the San Francisco
Bay area revealed that ideological, friendship, and altruistic reasons, along with increased
publicity, all played a role in the decision-making process to join advocacy coalitions.
Weisner (1983) also found a strong relationship between membership in coalitions and
perceived threats to an organization's funding. By and large, groups joined advocacy
coalitions to protest cuts in programs and to generate new revenue streams, with
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advancement of their own programs and constituencies a primary concern. The most
frequently cited benefit of joining a coalition, however, was the "enhanced ability to
gather and exchange information in an increasingly volatile and complex human services
field" (Weisner, 1983, p. 304).
Similarly, Cruz (2001) found that human service agencies in New Yorkjoined
interest groups, such as the New York State Association of Community and Residential
Agencies, to analyze and exchange information on public policies and government
budgets. In general, agencies joined to advance their political and fiscal prospects.
Agency leaders saw membership in associations as a tool to promote their cause through
a unifying structure that also provided additional resources such as staff lobbyists.
However, the most important benefit for joining was fiscal. As one executive director in
the study stated, "without anybody there to look at the state budget, I think it's fairly
obvious we would be in a disastrous position" (quoted at p. 82). Finally, Walker's (1991)
study of interest groups operating in Washington, D.C. reported that, from the perspective
of interest group leaders, purposive benefits consistently received high rankings on the
relative importance ofbenefits in attracting members, with most group leaders reporting
that solidary benefits were not nearly as important an incentive. "These group leaders
clearly believe that the maintenance of their organizations depends on their success as
representatives for their members or as advocates for a cause" (p. 92).
In summary, the literature provided a number of useful insights that guided this
study. First, while it appeared certain that an organization's ability to participate in
advocacy depended on its resources, the investigation on the role of organizational
capacity was not yet complete. How did organizational capacity influence an individual's
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ability to participate in advocacy? Next, Ezell's ( 1991, 1994) investigations on the impact
of official duty and job function on participation in advocacy revealed the importance of
these factors. However, Ezell's studies did not specifically address advocacy through
coalitions. Finally, the literature on motivation and interest groups provided a great deal
of direction for this study. There is an immense amount of complexity and variability in
the motives that drive people and groups. Clearly, the behavior of individuals and
organizations derives from a wide range of motives generated from both internal and
external forces, such as needs for safety, material gains, moral fulfillment, interpersonal
relations, and altruistic drives, to name a few. Additionally, motives are not universal, nor
are they steady state. Equally importantly, different motives appear to impact behavior
differently: some incentives are stronger motivators than others. Yet the literature is
inconclusive and contradictory at times. Are intrinsic motives, such as responsibility,
really more powerful than extrinsic incentives, such as financial gains? Furthermore,
motives are not an ali-or-nothing element to behavior. More than one motive, and with
varying degrees of intensity, could be powering actions. In fact, people's behavior could
be driven by a combination of their personal desires and their organizations' needs.
Additionally, members join advocacy coalitions for a wide range of reasons, and different
motives are tied to different roles and work levels. However, once again, the literature
seems inconclusive. Are material rewards or altruistic ideals more central to participation
in interest groups? Finally, while a wide range of incentives motivates action, it is
possible to develop groups of similar incentives in order to facilitate the empirical
specification and measurement of motivation. Without such specifications, the features of
this hypothetical, but important, construct would remain unknown. To that end, this study
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tested a series of hypotheses and explored a number of questions in order to enhance the
understanding of motivation and its role in advocacy coalitions.
Delineation of Research Questions
Hypothesis 1

The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to correlates with the
incentives that motivated them to join the coalition.
This investigation tested the relationship between the number of action alerts
members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and incentives. For the
purposes of this study, incentives were categorized as strategic, resource development,
and fellowship. This hypothesis predicted that there would be significant differences in
the number of action alerts that coalition members responded to based upon whether the
members had been primarily motivated by strategic, resource development, or fellowship
incentives to join the coalition. The project also explored how incentives shifted over
time. Turning to action alerts, the study explored the frequency of action alerts received
by coalition members and examined the similarities and differences between the
advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics conducted by
coalition members.
Hypothesis 2

The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to correlates with
their role in the coalition.
This investigation tested the relationship between the number of the action alerts
members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and their role in the
coalition. For the purposes of this study, roles were categorized as core, partner, and
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peripheral. The hypothesis predicted that there would be significant differences in the
number of action alerts coalition members responded to depending on whether their role
in the coalition was core, partner, or peripheral. This investigation also explored the
relationships between role and incentives.

Hypothesis 3
Coalition members who have advocacy as part of their official duties will respond
to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members who do not have
advocacy as part of their official duties.
This examination tested the relationship between the number of action alerts
members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and the presence or absence
of advocacy specified among their official duties. This hypothesis predicted that coalition
members that participated in advocacy activities as part of their official duties would
respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than coalition members that did
not have advocacy as part of their official duties. This study also explored the association
between official duties and incentives.

Hypothesis 4
Managers will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than
direct-service providers.
This examination tested the relationship between the number of action alerts
members of child-focused advocacy coalitions responded to and their job function. This
hypothesis predicted that coalition members whose primary job function was
management would respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than
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members whose primary job function was to provide services directly to clients. This
study also explored the relationship between job function and incentives.
Hypothesis 5

Coalition members from larger organizations will respond to a significantly
greater number of action alerts than members from smaller organizations.
This hypothesis built on the evidence at hand: larger organizations tended to
participate more in public policy. Would such predictors of public policy participation
hold true at the level of the individual participant? It was predicted that coalition
members from larger organizations would respond to a significantly greater number of
action alerts than members from smaller organizations. This study also explored the
relationship between organizational size and incentives.
So far, these hypotheses and exploratory research questions tended to seek
motivations separately. But in reality these factors probably did not operate in isolation;
they likely operated simultaneously. In order to gain a yet clearer picture of the
relationships among these factors, this study explored how incentives, role, official duty,
job function, and organizational capacity in conjunction impact the number of action
alerts to which coalition members responded.
Contributions to the Field
The aim was to add to the current body of knowledge in a number of important
ways. First of all, given the complexity of the concept of motivation, questions certainly
remained about the relationships between incentives and action. The study could add
more empirical evidence to this multifaceted construct. Next, the vast majority of the
literature on advocacy virtually ignored human service groups, whereas this study might

24

bring much-needed attention to child-focused advocacy groups. In fact, as McCarthy and
Castelli (200 1) strongly emphasized, the study of advocacy needed expansion in order to
develop a more comprehensive understanding of advocacy within the nonprofit sector.
Moreover, while recognizing that some researchers had examined the interest group
phenomenon in the nonprofit sector (Berry, 1977; Hula, 1999; Walker, 1991 ), these
researchers had focused predominately on national organizations based in Washington,
D.C. In contrast, this study focused on local and statewide groups in California. This was
an important distinction because state and local groups had different practices as
compared to their national counterparts (Reid, 2000). Additionally, although the
investigation was partly modeled on Hula's (1999) argument that the incentives
motivating a potential group member's decision to join a coalition were tied to the
member's work level for the coalition, Hula's conceptualization of work level included a
wide range of activities, even internal meetings, whereas this study narrowed the focus to
the question of response to action alerts. This tighter focus provided clarity to arguably
the most important activity for members of advocacy coalitions: heeding the call to
action. Furthermore, Hula had studied interest groups in general as members of advocacy
coalitions, whereas this study examined service providers in particular. This is an
important distinction because Hula's groups had primarily been policy actors joining
together in coalitions, whereas this study examined actors moving from a role primarily
in service provision to an expanded role in policy.
Furthermore, considering that the literature was nearly devoid of studies on
advocacy as dependent on official duty or job function, this examination added empirical
evidence to these important, yet considerably under-researched, factors. Many of the
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studies that had tested the relationship between organizational size and advocacy had
drawn on Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sources, yet De Vita et al. (2001) and Krehely
(200 1) had acknowledged this as a key weakness in their studies. "IRS reporting
requirements do not capture many advocacy activities" (De Vita et al., 2001, p. 32).
Instead of relying on financial data to determine levels of advocacy activity, this study
aimed to enrich the picture by utilizing additional measures of advocacy activity. Lastly,
current knowledge was also enhanced by investigating advocacy activities specifically
associated with advocacy coalitions. Previous studies, particularly those based on IRS
documents, had failed to differentiate between advocacy activities conducted
independently of advocacy coalitions and advocacy activities conducted with advocacy
coalitions. In summary, this study added to the current body of knowledge by examining
a unique combination of factors and their relationships to heeding the call to action. This
added important new insights to the understanding of child-focused advocacy coalitions
and, hopefully, would help these groups build a stronger voice for children.
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY
This chapter presents the methodology that was used to investigate the hypotheses
and exploratory research questions presented in Chapter 1, specifically the topics of
research design, description of subjects, operational definitions, procedures, treatment of
data, limitations, and ethical considerations.
Research Design
For this empirical study, a nomothetic approach was utilized as the broad
methodological framework. As such, the research sought to identify factors that were
generally associated with the number of calls to action members of child-focused
advocacy coalitions responded to. More specifically, it was a cross-sectional,
quantitative, mail survey that contained both explanatory and exploratory elements.

Explanatory Elements
•

Hypothesis 1: The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to
correlates with the incentives that motivated them to join the coalition.

•

Hypothesis 2: The number of action alerts that coalition members respond to
correlates with their role in the coalition.

•

Hypothesis 3: Coalition members who have advocacy as part oftheir official
duties will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members
who do not have advocacy as part of their official duties.

•

Hypothesis 4: Managers will respond to a significantly greater number of action
alerts than direct-service providers.
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•

Hypothesis 5: Coalition members from larger organizations will respond to a
significantly greater number of action alerts than members from smaller
organizations.

Exploratory Elements

•

Exploratory Question 1: How do incentives shift over time, if at all?

•

Exploratory Question 2: What is the frequency of action alerts received by
coalition members?

•

Exploratory Question 3: What are the similarities and differences between the
advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics conducted by
coalition members?

•

Exploratory Question 4: What is the association between role and incentives?

•

Exploratory Question 5: What is the association between official duties and
incentives?

•

Exploratory Question 6: What is the association between job function and
incentives?

•

Exploratory Question 7: What is the association between the organizational size
and incentives?

•

Exploratory Question 8: How do incentives, role, official duty, job function, and
organizational capacity in conjunction impact the number of action alerts to which
coalition members respond?
Subjects
The subjects of this study were individuals that met two primary criteria: they

worked at California nonprofit organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the
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Internal Revenue Code; 2) they were also named on action alert contact lists of childfocused advocacy coalitions in California. This was the appropriate population and unit
of analysis for the research questions, because for the coalitions included in this study,
the relevant individuals were those who had joined by adding their names to an action
alert list, who had received action alerts urging advocacy, and who had heeded the call to
action on behalf of children. Nonetheless, these individuals were primarily representing
their employer in the coalitions' activities. For the subjects of this study, their employers
were nonprofit organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code. It was assumed that the subjects' employers were service-based public charities. It
was also assumed that the subjects were adults, ages 18 or older, with a mix of male and
female subjects.
Operational Definitions of Concepts and Variables
The questionnaire titled "Survey of California Nonprofit Organizations" (see
Appendix A) served as the instrument for operationally defining the concepts and
variables in this study. Part I asked subjects about their membership in groups; such
groups were the child-focused advocacy coalitions preselected to participate in this study.
Question 1 sought to confirm that the subjects met subject criterion number 2 as
described previously. This study's definition of"member" was included in the
instructions for Question 1, which operationally defined the term and verified that the
subjects were indeed members of the child-focused advocacy coalitions participating in
this study; to eliminate responses from other organizations, respondents who indicated
"none of the above" were instructed to return the questionnaire. If any individual subject
was a member of more than one of the groups listed, then Question 1a asked the subject
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to select the group with which they considered themselves most active during the
previous twelve months. This provided consistency in the responses for subjects in more
than one group. Question 2 asked subjects to report their length of group membership.
This question was linked to the exploratory question 1.
Question 3 asked subjects to characterize their role in the group. This question
operationally defined role in hypothesis 2 and was linked to exploratory questions 4 and
8. Questions 4 through 7 collected information on incentives. For this section, questions
about reasons, were, in fact, asking about incentives. Question 4 inquired about the
incentives that had motivated subjects to join child-focused advocacy coalitions. For this
study, incentives were categorized as strategic, resource development, or fellowship.
These incentives were the independent variables for hypothesis 1 and also linked to
exploratory questions 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Question 4 utilized a composite measure to
operationally define each of these incentives. Strategic incentives were operationally
defined by combining level-of-influence scores from the following items: bringing about
social change to benefit others, expressing important personal values, achieving broad
goals, and providing altruistic service for others. Resource development incentives were
operationally defined by combining scores from these items: advancing one's
organization, protesting cuts in its funding, generating revenue for it, and maximizing
flow of money to it. Fellowship incentives were operationally defined by combining
scores from these items: associating with like-minded individuals, networking with
colleagues, obtaining mutual support in personal attitudes, and developing new
friendships. Question 6 relied on the same composite measure typology as Question 4 to
operationally define the incentives. This question was linked to exploratory question 1.
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Recognizing that questions 4 and 6 probably did not cover the full range of possible
reasons why the subjects had joined child-focused advocacy coalitions, Questions 5 and 7
allowed for some open-ended input. Answers to these questions enhanced the exploratory
dimension of this study.
Part II ofthe survey was about action alerts. This study's definition of action alert
was included in the instructions for this section. Question 8 asked about the frequency of
action alerts that subjects had received, and was linked to exploratory question 2.
Question 9 asked the subjects to make a best guess at the percentage of the total action
alerts they had acted on during the previous twelve months. This question operationally
defined the dependent variable included in hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4, along with
exploratory question 8. Question 10 asked subjects to indicate what advocacy activities
they had been urged to perform in the action alerts they had received, and also asked
them to indicate whether they had performed the requested activity at least once. This
question operationally defined advocacy by listing 21 activities that could influence the
proposed or actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities on behalf of
children. Recognizing that this question did not cover all possible advocacy tactics, the
question also provided a mechanism for subjects to include additional advocacy activities
in their response. Like question 8, this question was linked to the study's exploration on
action alerts. In this case, though, Question 10 was tied to exploratory question 3. Part III
of the survey was about the subjects' employers. Question 11 operationally defined
public charity and sought to confirm that the subjects met subject criterion number 1.
Since only organizations organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
qualified for the tax-deductible benefit, asking whether contributions to their organization
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were tax-deductible verified that that criterion was met. If contributions were not taxdeductible for a respondent's organization, Question lla collected information on what
type of organization best described their organization.
The next section of this chapter details procedures that were used to minimize
unqualified potential subjects from receiving the survey. Question 12 asked subjects to
indicate their primary job function as one of the following: provider of services to clients,
management, or other. This question operationally defined the independent variables for
hypothesis 4 and also provided input for exploratory questions 6 and 8. Question 13
asked subjects if advocacy was part of their job description. Tied to hypothesis 3, this
question operationally defined the independent variable official duty as having advocacy
as part of the subject's job description. This question also provided input for exploratory
questions 5 and 8. Questions 14 and 15 were linked to hypothesis 5 and exploratory
questions 7 and 8. Question 14 operationally defined the independent variable
organizational size as number of paid staff members, while question 15 operationally
defined organizational size as budget size in dollars.
Procedures

Selection ofSubjects
Selection of subjects began with the development of a list of child-focused
advocacy coalitions in California. This list was initially developed using the publicly
available Internet search engine located at http://www.google.com. Key word searches
using the words advocacy, coalition, child, children, youth, and California, among others,
were conducted in order to develop a list of organizations that merited further review.
Next, the Internet homepages of the organizations on this initial list were reviewed to
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determine whether the organizations fell within this study's definition and description of
child-focused advocacy coalition. Each of the organizations that appeared to meet the
definition was contacted by phone or email to confirm that it did, in fact, qualify for the
study. Specifically, was the organization serving as a unifying agency through which
organizational representatives were working collectively to influence the proposed or
actual policies of local, state, or federal government entities on behalf of children? Did
the organization's members include representatives from public charities? Did the
organization maintain an action alert contact list? If the organization did qualify, then a
request was made to provide the researcher with its action alert contact list. Recognizing
that the privacy of contact information on action alert lists might be an important factor in
an organization's decision to share their list, in order to facilitate participation in the
study, the researcher supplied organizations with information on the study, answered
questions, and provided assurances that the contact lists would be used only for this study
and that only the researcher would have access to the lists. A snowballing technique was
used to develop further the number of child-focused advocacy coalitions participating in
the study. All organizations that were contacted were asked for leads to other potentially
appropriate organizations.
In the end, advocacy alert contact lists from four child-focused advocacy
coalitions were selected for inclusion in this study. Coalition A was a statewide coalition
of approximately 500 members that focused on critically important issues, like teen
pregnancy and violence. Coalition A had six staff and an annual budget of about
$500,000. Coalition B was a statewide coalition of 83 members that focused on maternal
and child health, public health, and nutrition. Coalition B had 4 staff and an annual
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budget of about $1.5 million. Coalition C was a statewide coalition of about 17 5
members that represented over twenty child-related issues. Coalition C was part of the
school oflaw of a private university in California. Eight staff worked in the university's
center that provided leadership for Coalition C. Coalition D was a local coalition of about
1400 members that covered essentially all of the issues that faced children in a single
metropolitan area. Coalition D had six staff and an annual budget of approximately
$700,000. Selection of these coalitions was based, in part, on the availability and
willingness of child-focused advocacy coalitions to participate. Selection was also based
purposively, using the study's definition and description of child-focused advocacy
coalition as a guide to develop a pool of advocacy coalitions that most precisely met the
merits of the definition and the focus of this study.
Selection of subjects continued after the child-focused advocacy coalitions
provided the researcher with their action alert contact lists. The contact lists were
reviewed and edited to promote accurate subject selection with regards to the public
charity criteria. Individuals without an organizational affiliation, individuals with a
governmental affiliation, and employees of the unifying agency (i.e., the organization that
provided the list) were deleted from the contact lists. Next, the lists were combined and
sorted to search for individuals that belonged to more than one advocacy coalition.
Duplicate names were eliminated from all but one contact list in order to give all
potential subjects an equal chance of being selected and to prevent over-sampling of
more active individuals. The contact lists were then sorted back to group individuals by
their original contact list. In order to ensure that individuals from each advocacy coalition
were sufficiently included in the sample a probability proportionate to size (PPS)
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sampling procedure was utilized. More specifically, the total number of potential subjects
was calculated by adding up the number of individuals from each contact list. This
number was divided by 400 in order to calculate a number (X) to use for systematic
random sampling. A random starting point was determined and then every Xth individual
from each contact list was selected on a rotating basis until 400 potential subjects were
selected.
Gathering and Storing ofInformation

Information was gathered through a postal mail survey. Four hundred potential
subjects received a maximum of three contacts by postal mail. An initial introductory and
consent cover letter (see Appendix B), a survey and a pre-addressed, pre-stamped
envelope were sent to all400 potential subjects on March 15, 2004. Potential subjects
that did not respond by March 24,2004 were sent a reminder post card (see Appendix C).
Potential subjects that did not respond by April 9, 2004 were sent one final introductory
and consent cover letter (see Appendix D), a survey and a pre-addressed, pre-stamped
envelope. No experimental manipulations or interventions were conducted. Information
was recorded and stored in locked filing cabinets and password-protected Microsoft
Word, Microsoft Excel, and SPSS computer files; only the researcher had access to the
locked and password-protected files.
Treatment ofData
Several statistical analyses were used to treat the data. Broadly speaking, the
selection of statistical technique was based on the number of variables under
examination, on the level of measurement ofthose variables- for instance, nominal,
ordinal, or interval - and on whether the researcher sought a descriptive or inferential
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finding. Additionally, the level of significance was set at .05 for all statistical tests. To
start, each of the variables in the hypotheses and exploratory research questions was
examined using mode, mean, median, and frequency/percent distributions, where
appropriate. This series of analyses provided an initial body of findings before the
variables were plugged into the hypotheses and exploratory questions for testing.
First, for hypothesis 1, the treatment of data began with Crombach's index of
internal consistency on the items comprising each of the composite measures of
incentives. This hypothesis was tested using Pearson's product-moment correlation and a
stepwise regression analysis. Next, hypothesis 2 was tested using a one-way ANOVA
analyses. Hypothesis 2 was also examined using crosstabulations and chi-square by
recoding action from an interval variable to an ordinal variable. Since both hypotheses 3
and 4 consisted of dichotomous independent variables and an interval dependent variable,
two-sample t-tests for independent samples were used. Finally, data for hypothesis 5 were
tested in two ways. First, the relationship between the interval independent variable
number of paid staff members was tested against the interval dependent variable using
Pearson's product-moment correlation. Secondly, the ordinal variable budget size was
tested against the recoded action variable using crosstabulations and chi-square.
The exploratory questions were examined using a variety of techniques to
uncover important facets of the data. Frequency/percent distributions provided much of
the data treatment of exploratory questions 2 and 3. Exploratory questions 1, 4, 5, 6, and
7 were examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation, two-sample t-tests,
crosstabulations, chi-square, and ANOVA, where appropriate.
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Limitations
This study had several limitations. First, it was limited by its design. While
nomothetic, quantitative research provides a mechanism to identify causal factors that
generally impact a class of conditions, it is potentially limited in its richness of
examination. This design forwent a deep, qualitative investigation of incentives,
advocacy, and child-focused advocacy coalitions in favor of testing a limited number of
hypotheses in order to detect patterns. Additionally, it was limited to the definitions
prescribed for the concepts and variables under investigation. In order to promote mutual
understanding among interested parties and to facilitate quality research, each of the
definitions intentionally limited the examination. For instance, the definition of
"member" assumed that coalition members had the sanction of their organizations for
participation in the coalitions' activities. However, in actuality, this might not have been
the case. Furthermore, while this study attempted to explain variability in the number of
action alerts responded to by applying a template of incentive theories, perhaps other
theories, based on different assumptions, might have afforded clarity and answers
obscured by the limited view incentive theory provided. Next, the nature of incentives
presented limits. Incentives are a dynamic attribute, and they could have changed prior to,
during, or even after the research took place. Moreover, this study did not attempt to
isolate personal motives from organizational incentives. Rather, it assumed action was
driven by a combination of these forces. Nor did it address some potentially critical
factors. For example, the processes involved in weighing the study's limited number of
positive incentives against any number of unknown negative incentives or barriers
remained hidden.
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The study's procedures potentially limited the investigation as well. The
coalitions that participated in this study were a more formalized subset of the larger group
of child-focused advocacy coalitions. Less formalized coalitions - for instance coalitions
without separate staff, offices, or legal identities from their members and coalitions
formed under temporary or ad hoc arrangements- were excluded from this study.
Additionally, by using the Internet and snowball techniques to develop a group of childfocused advocacy coalitions to participate in the study, other relevant advocacy
coalitions, not detected by these methods, were excluded from the study. In fact, the
study was limited to the advocacy coalitions and their members that participated in the
study, and the findings should not be generalized beyond them. Also, purposive selection
of advocacy coalitions and editing of advocacy alert contact lists lends itself to inherent
conscious and unconscious bias. Additionally, relying on subjects' memory may have led
to inaccurate data collection. Subjects may have over-emphasized some incentives as
reasons for joining advocacy coalitions and over-reported the numbers of action alerts
responded to in a self-congratulatory way. Other methods of data collection on advocacy,
such as referring to evidence in primary sources like letters written or records of
testimony, might have supplied more accurate information.
Ethical Considerations
This study's investigation considered the rights of its subjects. To begin with,
participation in the research was voluntary and occurred only after a disclosure of the
possible risks. The introductory consent and cover letter (Appendix B) detailed both the
voluntary nature and possible risks of this project and provided a reasonable level of
informed consent to potential subjects. While the study did not afford the protection of
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anonymity to its subjects, several measures were taken to ensure that the subjects'
identities would in fact remain confidential. Surveys were numerically coded and return
envelopes were separated from completed surveys in order to protect the subjects'
identities. All records remained, and will remain, permanently confidential, only the
researcher having access to the coded and locked files; identities will not be revealed in
any reports, publications, or conversations resulting from the study.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS
This chapter presents the results of the research. The level of significance was set
at .05 for all statistical tests. The data supported hypothesis 1 but failed to support
hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Overview of Responses
Response Rate

A total of 194 responses to the survey were received. However, some were
excluded from the study. Twenty-nine were excluded because they were returned
indicating that the potential subjects were no longer employed at that address, while an
additional 12 were returned as undeliverable as addressed. Additionally, using survey
Question 11 as a guide, 10 responses were excluded because the respondents did not meet
subject criterion 1; that is, they did not work at California nonprofit organizations
organized under Section 501(c)(3) ofthe Internal Revenue Code. Two responses were
from nonprofit organizations not organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 5 from local, state, or federal government agencies, 1 from a for-profit
organization, and 2 were indeterminable. Finally, 23 responses were excluded because
the respondents did not meet subject criterion 2: they did not appear on the action alert
contact lists of the child-focused advocacy coalitions participating in this study. In sum,
120 responses were used for the study, for a final valid response rate of 36.8%. These
responses constituted the subjects of the study (N = 120). The subjects were affiliated
with child, youth, or family-related organizations located throughout California in both
rural and urban settings. Nearly all of the subjects' organizations were social service,
educational, recreational, or healthcare agencies. It should be noted that not every subject
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completed the survey in its entirety; actual sample sizes (n) for particular tests and perceil calculations are presented throughout this chapter.

Advocacy Coalition Membership
Table 1 shows the results of coalition membership as the subjects indicated in
question 1 ofthe survey. This table shows that the largest portion of subjects were
members of Coalition D (n = 50).

Table 1

Summary of Coalition Membership
Coalitions

%

n

Coalition A

31.7

38

Coalition B

13.3

16

Coalition C

25.8

31

Coalition D

41.7

50

N= 120

Note. Total percentage is greater than 100% because 15 subjects were members of more
than one advocacy coalition.
Results of Explanatory Elements

Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 brought together the central elements ofthis study: incentives and
action. The number of action alerts that coalition members responded to correlates with
the incentives that motivated them to join the coalition. Starting with an examination of
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incentives, Table 2 highlights key results from Question 4 of the survey, which asked the
subjects to report what reasons initially motivated them to join the advocacy coalition
they selected in Question 1. This table shows that more than 50% of the subjects (n = 65)
indicated that bringing about social change to benefit others had a significant influence
on their decision to join the advocacy coalition, whereas more than 40% of the subjects (n
=

47) reported that generating revenue for their organization had no influence on their

decision.

Table 2

Most and Least Influential Reasons to Join Coalitions
%

Reasons

n

Most Frequent Significant Influencea
Bring about social change to benefit others

55.6

65

Network with colleagues

35.6

42

Achieve broad goals

32.2

37

Most Frequent No Influenceb
Generate revenue for your organization

41.6

47

Maximize flow of money to your organization

39.6

44

Develop new friendships

27.9

31

aSignificant influence equals score of 4 on survey; bno influence equals score of 0.
However, as described in Chapter 3, this study used composite measures of the
items in Question 4 of the survey to test this hypothesis. Specifically, strategic incentives
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were calculated by combining scores from the items "bring about social change to benefit
others," "express important personal values," "achieve broad goals," and "provide
altruistic service for others"; resource development incentives were calculated by
combining scores from the items "advance your organization," "protest cuts in funding to
your organization," "generate revenue for your organization," and "maximize flow of
money to your organization"; and fellowship incentives were calculated by combining
scores from the items "associate with like-minded individuals," "network with
colleagues," "obtain mutual support in personal attitudes," and "develop new
friendships." Referring again to Table 2, it is noteworthy that two of the items that
formed strategic incentives were among the three most frequent "significant influence"
items, whereas, in contrast, two of the items that formed resource development incentives
made up two of the top three most frequent "no influence" items.
Next, examinations using Crombach's index of internal consistency were
performed on each of the composite incentives. Resource development incentives had the
highest alpha at .7789, followed by fellowship incentives with an alpha of .6938, and
strategic incentives with an alpha of .5618. A review ofthese findings merited keeping
the composite incentives as originally formulated. The means for each of the composite
incentives were calculated as well. As shown in Table 3, strategic incentives had the
highest mean score at M= 10.47 (SD = 2.978), whereas resource development incentives
had the lowest mean at M = 6.96 (SD = 4.264).
Additionally, Question 5 of the survey provided an opportunity for subjects to
report other reasons that motivated them to join the advocacy coalition. By far the most
frequently stated other reason, with 22 subjects so reporting, was to acquire information.
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For example, Subject 254 stated that he or she joined "to receive updated current
information on a regular basis regarding children's issues." The next most frequently
cited reason for joining was the quality of the advocacy coalition or its staff (n = 10). As
Subject 368 stated, "[Coalition D] is a visionary, action oriented, big hearted organization
committed to making a huge difference for children, youth and families." Or, as Subject
167 reported, "support due to excellent Executive Director [and] staff." Interestingly,
only one subject reported that he or she "was asked to join" was the primary reason
(Subject 277). Finally, Subject 366 asserted, "I don't do it for the money, I do it for the
justice."

Table 3
Means ofIncentives to Join Coalitions

Composite Measures

M

SD

n

Strategic Incentives

10.47

2.978

111

Resource Development Incentives

6.96

4.264

108

Fellowship Incentives

8.98

3.229

109

Next, descriptive statistics were performed on Question 9 of the survey in order to
examine some ofthe dimensions of the variable action. The mean for percentage of
action alerts acted upon during the previous twelve months was M = 31.61 (SD = 27.530)
with the median level of action at 20.0. A frequency analysis also revealed that the range
varied from 0% to 100% and that the majority of subjects (50.9%, n =54) acted upon
20% or fewer of the action alerts they had received during the previous twelve months. In
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fact, nearly 20% ofthe subjects (19.8%, n = 21) acted upon 10% or fewer of the action
alerts they had received. Very few subjects reported additional tactics. One noteworthy
one was "help with candidate forum" (Subject 372).
Hypothesis 1 was initially tested using Pearson's product-moment correlation
(two-tailed). As Table 4 illustrates, each of the composite measures of incentives was
correlated with action at a significant level, with the strongest correlation between
strategic incentives and action (r = .356,p < .01), followed by fellowship and action (r =

.305,p < .01) and resource development and action (r = .248,p < .05).

Table 4
Correlations Between Incentives to Join Coalitions and Action
Variables

1

1. Action
2. Strategic Incentives

3

4

.356**

.248*

.305**

.293**

.457**

.356**

3. Resource Development Incentives .248*
4. Fellowship Incentives

2

.293**

.305**

.457**

.483**
.483**

Note. Data examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation (two-tailed).

*p < .05. **p < .01.

Additionally, each of the incentives was significantly correlated with each of the others.
In particular, fellowship incentives were strongly correlated with both strategic incentives
(r = .457,p < .01) and resource development incentives (r = .483,p < .01). Hypothesis 1
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was also examined using a stepwise regression analysis. As shown in Table 5, this
method revealed that the best equation for prediction of variance in action would include
strategic incentives and fellowship incentives, while excluding resource development
2

incentives (r

=

.173 ). The findings from the regression analysis made clear that the

incentives were separate dimensions statistically even though the incentives were highly
correlated with each other. Taken together with the Pearson's analysis of the relationship
between incentives and action, the evidence supported hypothesis 1: The number of
action alerts that coalition members responded to correlated with the incentives that
motivated them to join the coalition.

Table 5

Stepwise Regression Analysis ofIncentives to Join Coalitions
B

SEB

3.371

.889

.364**

Strategic Incentives

2.398

.984

.259*

Fellowship Incentives

1.859

.870

.227*

Independent Variables

Step 1a
Strategic Incentives
Step 2b

Note. Dependent variable is action.
aR 2 for step 1 = .133;

2
br

for step 2 = .173.

*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the number of action alerts that coalition members
respond to correlates with their role in the coalition. Results from Question 3 of the
survey revealed that the vast majority of subjects characterized their role as peripheral
(75%, n = 63), whereas core members constituted 16% ofthe subjects (n = 19) and 21%
of the subjects reported their role as partner (n = 25). Table 6 begins the examination of
the relationship between role and action by showing that core members had the highest
mean of action (M= 37.50, SD = 28.460) and peripheral members had the lowest (M=
28.37, SD = 27.573). Interestingly, though, core members and partners had nearly the
same means for action. However, a one-way ANOVA analysis found no statistical
difference in action between core, partner, and peripheral groups, df = 2, F = 1.327, p =
.270.

Table 6
Summary of Coalition Roles and Mean Scores for Action
Role

M

SD

n

Core

37.50

28.460

16

Partner

37.36

26.269

22

Peripheral

28.37

27.573

68

Next, action was recoded from an interval variable to an ordinal variable in order
to test hypothesis 2 using crosstabulations and chi-square. Table 7 shows that the
majority of subjects reported less than 50% action regardless of role. Moreover, the chi-
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square tests were not significant, X 2(2, n

= 106),

p = .536. Taken together with the

ANOVA analysis, the data did not support hypothesis 2: the number of action alerts that
coalition members responded to was not correlated with role in the coalition.

Table 7
Crosstabulation of Coalition Roles and Action
Core(%)

Partner(%)

Peripheral (%)

Action< 50%

9 (56.3)

12 (54.5)

45 (66.2)

Action>= 50%

7 (43.8)

10(45.5)

23 (33.8)

Total

(100%)

(100%)

(100%)

Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 stated that coalition members who have advocacy as part oftheir
official duties will respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than
members who do not have advocacy as part of their official duties. Responses to
Question 13 of the survey revealed that more than two thirds of the subjects (69.8%, n =
81) reported that advocacy was part of their job description, whereas about one third of
the subjects (30.2%, n = 35) indicated that advocacy was not part of their job description.
As predicted, subjects with advocacy included as part of their official duties had a greater
mean for action (M = 34.53, SD = 26.650) than subjects who did not have advocacy
included among their official duties (M = 24.06, SD = 26.480). However, a two-sample ttest for independent samples failed to confirm a significant difference in action between
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these two groups, t (103) = 1.790,p = .076, n = 105 (two-tailed). Given this evidence, the
data supported hypothesis 3 as a description of the sample, but not inferentially for the
underlying population: advocacy as an official duty was not related to the number of
action alerts coalition members responded to.
Hypothesis 4

According to hypothesis 4, managers will respond to a significantly greater
number of action alerts than direct-service providers. Results from Question 12 of the
survey showed that the great majority of subjects indicated their primary job function as
management 71.3% (n = 82), whereas 17.4% (n = 20) indicated their job function as
service providers and 11.3% (n = 13) reported other. It should be noted that three
responses in the category other were recoded into service provider because of the nature
ofthe description provided by the subject (e.g., "teacher"). Contrary to the prediction,
service providers had a higher mean for action (M = 37.21, SD = 31.699) than managers
(M = 32.82, SD = 27 .177). However, a two-sample t-test for independent samples failed

to confirm a significant difference between these two groups, t (88) = .542, p = .589, n =
90 (two-tailed). Overall, the data did not support hypothesis 4: job function was not
related to the number of action alerts coalition members responded to.
Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis 5 predicted that coalition members from larger organizations would
respond to a significantly greater number of action alerts than members from smaller
organizations. Results from Question 14 of the survey revealed the mean and median for
the number of paid staff(M= 69.75, SD = 150.138, MDN= 25.00). It should be noted
that a small number of organizations had a much larger paid staff than the more typical
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organization in the study. In fact, while 95% of the subjects' organizations (n

=

113) had

staff sizes of fewer than 300 employees, one organization was reported to have 1400
employees. Additionally, Table 8 illustrates that the majority of subjects (56.8%, n = 67)
reported in response to Question 15 of the survey that their organization's budget size
was more than $1 million. An examination using Pearson's product-moment correlation
found no significant correlation between staff size and action, r = .159, p = .1 03, n = 106
(two-tailed).
Next, a crosstabulation of budget size and action was performed. For this test,
budget size was recoded into either less than, or equal to, or greater than $1 million.
Table 9 shows that the majority of subjects reported that they responded to 50% or fewer
action alerts regardless of their organization's budget size. In fact, a chi-square analysis
did not find a significant difference between these groups, X2 (1, n = 105) = 3.278, p =
.070. Overall, the evidence did not support hypothesis 5.

Table 8
Summary ofReported Budget Sizes

Budget Size

%

n

2.5

3

$101,000 to $500,000

22.9

27

$500,000 to $1 million

17.8

21

More than $1 million

56.8

67

Less than $100,000

50

Table 9

Cross tabulation of Budget Size and Action
<=$1 million (%)

Budget

>$1 million(%)

Action< 50%

34 (72.3)

32 (55.2)

Action>= 50%

13 (27.7)

26 (44.8)

Total

(100%)

(100%)

Results of Exploratory Elements

Exploratory Question I
Exploratory question 1 investigated how, if at all, incentives shifted over time.
Table 10 highlighted key data from Question 6 of the survey, which asked the subjects to
report what reasons motivated them to remain members of the advocacy coalition they
selected in Question 1. This table shows that more than 50% of subjects (52.6%, n = 60)
indicated that bringing about social change to benefit others had a significant influence
on their decision to remain a member, whereas nearly one third of subjects (32.1 %, n =
35) reported that the aim of generating revenue for their organization had no influence on
their decision to remain. When compared to the reasons to join advocacy coalitions set
out in Table 2, it appears that the reasons to join were quite similar to the reasons to
remain; all six of the reasons listed in each table are the same, appearing in nearly
identical order with, for the most part, only modest changes in percentages.
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Table 10

Most and Least Influential Reasons to Remain in Coalitions
Reasons

%

n

Most Frequent Significant Influencea
Bring about social change to benefit others

52.6

60

Achieve broad goals

33.3

38

Network with colleagues

34.8

39

Most Frequent No Influenceb
Generate revenue for your organization

32.1

35

Maximize flow of money to your organization

28.7

31

Develop new friendships

23.6

26

aSignificant influence equals score of 4 on survey; bno influence equals score of 0.
Next, Question 7 of the survey provided subjects with an opportunity to describe
other reasons that motivated them to remain members of the advocacy coalition. The
comments on this question paralleled the responses to Question 5. Information was by far
the most frequently cited reason (n

=

15) followed by the quality of the advocacy

coalition or its staff (n = 4). Additional comments included "loyalty to the organization"
(Subject 59) and "assigned by my agency" (Subject 140). Finally, Subject 341 wrote, "As
an early childhood education provider it is a part of my professionalism to be an advocate
for families and their children so I have to remain in the organization so as not to go
against one of the norms of my profession."
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Next, means for the composite measures of incentives to remain were calculated.
As Table 11 illustrates, strategic incentives had the highest mean at M = 10.60 (SD =
3 .282), while resource development incentives had the lowest mean at M == 7.5 8 (SD =
3.749). These results were strikingly similar to the results for incentives to join in Table
3; each of the incentives held to the same position relative to other incentives.

Table 11
Means ofIncentives to Remain in Coalitions

Composite Measures

M

SD

n

Strategic Incentives

10.60

3.282

107

Resource Development Incentives

7.58

4.318

106

Fellowship Incentives

8.96

3.749

106

To peer further into exploratory question 1, a Pearson's product-moment
correlation amongst the incentives was conducted (two-tailed). The results illustrated in
Table 12 indicate that the incentives reported for joining advocacy coalitions were
significantly correlated (p < .01) with their corresponding incentives for remaining. In
fact, the correlation for resource development had a very strong correlation (r = .903),
followed by fellowship incentives (r = .787) and strategic incentives (r = .728). Further,
with the exception of the correlation between strategic incentives to join with resource
development incentives to remain, all of the inter-correlations among the various pairs of
incentives were highly significant.
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Table 12
Correlations Between Incentives to Join and Incentives to Remain in Coalitions
Variables

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

.293**

.457**

.728**

.144

.461 **

.483**

.379**

.903**

.434**

.463**

.396**

.787**

.392**

.666**

Incentives to Join
1. Strategic
2. Resource Develop .. 293**
3. Fellowship

.457**

.483**

.728**

.379**

.463**

.903**

.396**

.392**

.434**

.787**

.666**

Incentives to Remain
4. Strategic

5. Resource Develop .. 144
6. Fellowship

.461 **

.448**
.448**

Note. Data examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation (two-tailed).

**p < .01.
These findings demonstrated that strong predictions could be made from joining
to remaining and among the numerous pairs of incentives. However, an examination of
the extent ofthe shift from joining to remaining was still needed to explore this question
fully. A paired sample t-test (two-tailed) accomplished this task. As Table 13 shows, only
resource development incentives significantly changed. In fact, resource development
incentives increased from a mean of 7.10 (SD = 4.225) as an incentive to join advocacy
coalitions to a mean of7.63 as an incentive to remain (SD = 4.379). Recognizing that
length of time as a member might impact the shift in incentives, an additional paired
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sample t-test (two-tailed) was conducted on only those subjects who reported in Question
2 of the survey that their length of membership in the advocacy coalition was about one
to three years or more than three years. These results were nearly identical to the results
of the first paired sample t-test. For instance, material incentives significantly increased
as a motivation to join advocacy coalitions (M = 7 .24, SD = 4.364) when compared with
their strength as an incentive to remain (M= 7.79, SD = 4.462).

Table 13
Paired Sample T-tests ofIncentives to Join Coalitions to Incentives to Remain in
Coalitions
M

SD

df

Strategic Join

10.61

2.847

105

.084

106

Strategic Remain

10.59

3.297

Resource Join

7.10

4.225

100

-2.827**

101

Resource Remain

7.63

4.379

Fellowship Join

9.00

3.289

104

.293

104

Fellowship Remain

8.93

3.766

Incentives

n

t

Pair 1

Pair 2

Pair 3

**p < .01.
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Exploratory Question 2

Exploratory question 2 asked, what is the frequency of action alerts received by
coalition members? Table 14 shows that the portion of subjects (37.9%, n = 44) received
action alerts once per month or less as indicated in Question 8 of the survey.
Additionally, crosstabulations revealed that the majority of subjects (62.9%, n = 73) acted
upon 33% or fewer of the action alerts regardless of the frequency of receiving them.

Table 14
Summary ofFrequency of Receiving Action Alerts

Group

%

n

Once per month or less

37.9

44

Two times per month

25.0

29

Three times per month

12.1

14

Four or more times per month

21.6

25

Exploratory Question 3

Table 15 reveals some of the key similarities and differences between the
advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics conducted by
coalition members during the twelve months prior to the study. For example, endorsing
circular letters or petitions had the highest frequency for a tactic requested and conducted
at least once during the previous twelve months, while faxing elected officials had the
highest frequency for a tactic that was requested but was not conducted at least once;
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filing suit or engaging in other legal action had the highest frequency for a tactic that was
never requested.

Table 15

Advocacy Tactics Most Frequently Requested and Conducted, Most Frequently
Requested and Not Conducted, and Most Frequently Not Requested
%

Advocacy Tactics

n

Most Frequently Requested and Conducted
Endorse circular letters or petitions

64.1

66

Participate in rallies or demonstrations

62.9

66

Email elected officials

61.9

65

Distribute literature about public policy issues

60.8

62

Most Frequently Requested and Not Conducted
Fax elected officials

38.6

39

Phone elected officials

37.3

38

Submit letters to the editor or op-ed pieces

33.3

33

Mail government agency directors

32.7

32

Most Frequently Not Requested
File suit or engage in other legal action

87.3

89

Conduct voter registration drive

74.5

76

Conduct research or data collection

64.7

66

Submit letters to the editor or op-ed pieces

55.6

55
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The data also showed that email was the most frequently conducted tactical means
of contacting elected officials or government agency directors. However, elected officials
were contacted by email at twice the rate applying to agency directors (61.9%, n = 65;
27.9%, n = 29, respectively). This distinction between elected officials and agency
directors was repeated for mail, fax, and phone contact. Further, while more than one
third of the subjects (39.6%, n = 40) reported having testified at a public hearing at least
once during the previous twelve months, about the same number of subjects (n = 41) had
never been asked to testify. Finally, the results showed that more than 50% (58.7%, n =
61) of subjects had mobilized their clients for advocacy at least once during the previous
twelve months.

Exploratory Question 4
Exploratory question 4 sought to uncover the relationships among core, partner,
and peripheral roles in advocacy coalitions and each of the strategic, resource
development, and fellowship incentives for joining and remaining. To examine these
relationships, incentives were recoded from an interval variable to an ordinal variable and
then crosstabulations and chi-square analyses were performed. The only significant
findings were discovered in the relationships between role and strategic incentives for
joining advocacy coalitions. As Table 16 shows, strategic incentives had at least a minor
influence on all of the subjects' decisions to join advocacy coalitions, regardless of role.
However, strategic incentives had a strong influence on all ofthe core members (n = 18)
and nearly all of the partner members (n = 20), whereas, in contrast, one third of the
peripheral members reported that strategic incentives were only a minor or moderate
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influence on their decision. As mentioned, the chi-square test was significant, X 2(2, n =
110) = 10.596,p = .005.

Table 16

Cross tabulation ofRole and Strategic Incentives to Join Coalitions
Influence of Strategic Incentives
Role

No\%)

Core

0 (0)

0 (0)

18(21.4)

Partner

0 (0)

3 (11.5)

20 (23.8)

Peripheral

0 (0)

23 (88.5)

46 (54.8)

Total

(0%)

(100%)

(100%)

Minor/Moderate\%) Strong/Significantc (%)

~o score equals 0; bminor/moderate score equals 1 through 8; cstrong/significant score

equals 9 through 16.

Exploratory Question 5
This question sought to uncover the relationship between advocacy as an official
duty and incentives. Using a series of two-sample t-tests for independent samples (twotailed), Table 17 shows that significant differences were found only in fellowship
incentives to remain members of advocacy coalitions where the mean for those subjects
who reported that advocacy was not part of their job description was higher (M = 10.34,

SD = 3.062) than those subjects who reported advocacy was part of their job description
(M = 8.36, SD = 3.843).
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Table 17
Independent Samples T-tests ofAdvocacy as an Official Duty to Incentives
Incentives

Advocacy in M(n)
job description?

SD

df

t

106

.732

Incentives to Join
Yes

10.53 (78)

2.691

No

10.00 (30)

3.562

Yes

6.93 (75)

4.260

103

-.361

No

7.27 (30)

Yes

8.78 (76)

3.393

104

-.980

No

9.47 (30)

2.921

Yes

10.33 (76)

3.296

102

-.831

No

10.93 (28)

3.173

Yes

7.25 (75)

4.439

102

-1.223

No

8.41 (29)

4.067

Yes

8.36 (76)

3.843

103

-2.499*

No

10.34 (26)

3.062

Strategic

Resource

Fellowship

Incentives to Remain

Strategic

Resource

Fellowship

*p < .05.
Exploratory Question 6
This exploratory question examined the association between primary job function
and incentives, once again using a series of two-sample t-tests for independent samples
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(two-tailed). As Table 18 illustrates, no significant differences were found between
service providers and managers in their incentives to join advocacy coalitions or their
incentives to remain.

Table 18

Independent Samples T-tests ofPrimary Job Function to Incentives
Incentives

Job Function M(n)

SD

df

Management 11.21 (19)

2.992

95

1.170

Service

10.33 (78)

2.917

Management

6.00 (18)

3.199

91

-1.702

Service

7.55 (75)

4.391

Management

9.35 (17)

2.621

92

.575

Service

8.84 (77)

3.426

Management 10.88 (17)

3.740

92

.353

10.58 (77)

3.015

Management

6.38 (16)

3.998

91

-1.344

Service

7.96 (77)

4.351

Management

9.47 (17)

3.502

92

.708

Service

8.75 (77)

3.839

t

Incentives to Join

Strategic

Resource

Fellowship

Incentives to Remain

Strategic
Service

Resource

Fellowship
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Exploratory Question 7
Exploratory question 7 investigated the relationship between organizational size
and incentives. This was first accomplished through a series of Pearson's productmoment correlations. As Table 19 shows, no significant correlations were found between
staff size and either incentives to join advocacy coalitions or incentives to remain (twotailed).

Table 19

Correlations Between Staff Size and Incentives

Variables

Number of
Paid Staff(n)

Incentives to Join
Strategic

-.093 (110)

Resource Development

-.107 (108)

Fellowship

-.058 (109)

Incentives to Remain
Strategic

-.034 (106)

Resource Development

-.087 (106)

Fellowship

-.002 (107)

Note. Data examined using Pearson's product-moment correlation (two-tailed); n =percell sample size.
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Additionally, in order to conduct a second set of Pearson's correlation
coefficients, budget size was recoded from an ordinal variable to interval variable using
the midpoints of the ordinal scale. As shown in Table 20, like staff size, no significant
findings were found in the correlations between budget size and incentives (two-tailed).

Table 20
Correlations Between Budget Size and Incentives

Variables

Budget Size
Interval (n)

Incentives to Join
Strategic

.022 (110)

Resource Development

.043 (106)

Fellowship

.013 (107)

Incentives to Remain
Strategic

.130 (106)

Resource Development

.084 (106)

Fellowship

.051 (106)

Note. Budget size recoded from an ordinal variable to an interval variable using the
midpoints of the ordinal scale; data examined using Pearson's product-moment
correlation (two-tailed); n =per-ceil sample size.
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Exploratory Question 8
This exploratory question was formulated on the prediction that the factors of
incentives, job function, official duty, and organizational size would each have a
significant relationship to action. However, since only incentives were found to have a
significant relationship with action, the path analysis model was not conducted as
planned. Rather, it will be the charge of future research to include multiple factors in an
examination of their relationship to action.
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CHAPTER FOUR: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter reviews the problem, summarizes the findings, discusses the
important results, offers implications for the existing literature and organizational
practices, recommends improvements to this study, and suggests avenues for further
research.
Review of the Problem
America needs to muster significant resources to ensure that children remain safe,
live healthy lives, and succeed in school. America's children are undoubtedly
underrepresented in the democratic process, and public policy advocacy on their behalf is
urgently needed to meet the needs of one of our nation's most dependent and vulnerable
populations. Among the important resources available to conduct advocacy on behalf of
children are the service providers that children encounter in public charities such as
human and social service agencies, hospitals, and educational organizations. Some of
these service providers are already engaged in advocacy through a network of advocacy
coalitions. These individuals have combined in order to collectively influence public
policy. Yet the success of advocacy coalitions is fundamentally dependent on their
members heeding the call to action, that is to say, acting upon alert messages that urge
advocacy. Without action, advocacy coalitions cannot effect changes in public policy.
While a number of factors likely influence the responsiveness of coalition members to
calls to action, this project examined a central factor in all behavior: the motives behind
it.
There is an immense amount of complexity and variability in the motives that
drive people and groups. Behavior is derived from a wide range of motives generated
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from both personal and organizational forces, such as needs for moral fulfillment,
altruistic drives, interpersonal relations, and material gains, to name a few. Additionally,
not all motives are universal and, equally importantly, different motives appear to impact
behavior differently. But what do individual motives and organizational factors have to
do with individuals from public charities joining and participating in child-focused
advocacy coalitions? To add to the understanding of this important subject, this study
tested five hypotheses and explored seven additional questions in order to enhance the
understanding of motivation and its role in advocacy coalitions. Why do individuals from
public charities join child-focused advocacy coalitions? Is there an association between
reasons for joining advocacy coalitions and the frequency of heeding the calls to action?
How do other factors, such as role in the coalition, job function, advocacy as an official
duty, and organizational size, impact coalition members heeding the call to action?
Summary of Results
Surveys were mailed to 400 members of child-focused advocacy coalitions in
California. Responses were received from 120 subjects, yielding a final valid response
rate of 36.8%, with the largest portion of subjects having been members of Coalition D.

Explanatory Elements
Several significant results were revealed with regards to hypothesis 1. First, the
hypothesis was supported: the number of action alerts that coalition members responded
to was correlated with the incentives that motivated them to join the coalition. Strategic
incentives had the strongest positive correlation, followed by fellowship incentives and
resource development incentives. A combination of strategic and fellowship incentives
served as a significant predictor of up to 17.3% of the variance in action. An examination
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of the results showed that two of the top three "most significantly influencing" reasons to
join advocacy coalitions were tied to strategic incentives, whereas two of the top three
"non-influential items" were tied to resource development incentives. Overall, a picture
emerged showing that strategic incentives were the most influential incentives to join
advocacy coalitions, with the largest positive correlation with action. By contrast,
resource development incentives were the least influential incentives to join advocacy
coalitions, with the smallest positive correlation with action. Fellowship incentives fell in
between strategic and resource development incentives for both influence to join and
correlation with action.
Still other significant findings emerged from the testing of hypothesis 1. For
instance, there were significant positive correlations among the various pairs of
incentives. The results revealed that strategic, fellowship, and resource development
incentives were all significantly and positively correlated with each other. Finally, the
data showed that the mean level of action was about 33%, with the majority of subjects
having acted upon one fifth or fewer of the action alerts they had received during the
previous twelve months. The results, however, were not statistically significant for the
remaining hypotheses.
Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5 were not supported by the data. For hypothesis 2, core
and partner members had higher means for action in the sample than peripheral members,
but no statistically significant difference was detected. Since three fourths of the subjects
were peripheral members, the small sample size of the core and partner members may
have inhibited detection of a statistical difference in action between the groups. It should
also be noted that since a large portion of the subjects identified themselves as peripheral
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members, this might have skewed the findings throughout the study towards these selfidentified outermost participants of the advocacy coalitions. Next, for hypothesis 3, no
significant difference in action was detected between those subjects reporting that
advocacy was part of their job description compared to those subjects reporting that
advocacy was not part oftheir job description. Since more than two thirds of the subjects
reported that advocacy was part of their job description, the small sample size for
comparison may have inhibited detection of a significant difference.
Interestingly, for hypothesis 4, the results ran contrary to the prediction: subjects
who reported their job function as service to clients had a higher, not lower, mean for
action than managers. However, further statistical analysis failed to reveal a significant
difference. Because more than four times as many subjects were managers as compared
to service staff, the small sample size for service staff may have precluded detection of a
significant difference in action. Finally, the examination of hypothesis 5 found no
relationship between organizational size and action. No correlation was found between
staff size and action, nor were differences in action revealed between the various budget
sizes. With regards to budget size, because the majority of subjects reported their
organization's budget as more than $1 million, actual differences could have been
obscured by the imprecise nature of the top-heavy data in ordinal scale for budget.

It should be underscored that since the results supported hypothesis 1, there is
probably a relationship between incentives and action in the population under
examination. However, the fact the results failed to support hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5 does
not mean that no differences exist in action with regards to role, official duty, job
function, or organizational size. While individuals within each of these groups may have
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heeded similar percentages of calls to action during the previous twelve months,
differences may appear on other dimensions of action such as types of advocacy activity
undertaken. Additional research is warranted to confirm the null hypothesis of the
unsubstantiated predictions.
Exploratory Elements
The data revealed a number of significant findings during the examination of
exploratory question 1. First, the results showed that the relative influence of strategic,
fellowship, and resource development incentives on subjects' decisions to remain
members of advocacy coalitions was the same as on their decision to join: strategic
incentives were most influential, followed by fellowship and then resource development
incentives. Additionally, the incentives to remain members were strongly correlated with
the incentives to join; as incentives to join increased, there tended to be a corresponding
increase in incentives to remain. However, a significant shift from joining to remaining
appeared only in resource development incentives. The mean for resource development
incentives to remain was significantly higher than the mean for resource development
incentives to join. In fact, with regards to strategic and fellowship incentives, there was
essentially no meaningful shift at all.
Next, exploratory questions 2 and 3 inquired into action alerts. The data revealed
that most subjects received action alerts once per month or less. The results also showed
that most subjects acted upon 33% or fewer ofthe action alerts, regardless of the
frequency of receiving them. Endorsing letters or circular petitions and participating in
rallies were the two most frequently requested and conducted advocacy tactics. Email
was the most frequently conducted means of contacting elected officials and government
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agency directors. Elected officials were contacted at twice the rate of agency directors.
Finally, while the data revealed that the majority of subjects had mobilized their clients
for advocacy at least once during the previous twelve months and that more than one
third of the subjects reported having testified at a public hearing, various other advocacy
tactics -

for example, legal action, voter registration, and undertaking research -

had

yet to be requested by advocacy coalitions to any meaningful degree.
The investigation of exploratory question 4 showed that strategic incentives
played a part in all of the subjects' decisions to join advocacy coalitions, regardless of
their role. Moreover, all of the core members reported that strategic incentives played a
strong influence on their decision to join. Next, regarding exploratory question 5, the
results demonstrated that fellowship incentives played a significantly greater part in the
decision to remain members of advocacy coalitions for those subjects who did not have
advocacy in their job description than it did for those subjects who did have advocacy in
their job description.
Finally, no significant findings were discovered with regards to exploratory
question 6 or exploratory question 7. The data did not reveal any relationship between
incentives and job function, nor did the results show any relationship between
organizational size and incentives.
Discussion of Important Results

Incentives and Action
This research sought to understand why individuals from public charities joined
child-focused advocacy coalitions and to identify factors that influenced responses to the
call to action. Motivations were revealed and important factors were identified. This
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study discovered that the incentives to join advocacy coalitions were positively correlated
with the number of calls to action that members of advocacy coalitions responded to. As
the influence of the incentives to join increased, there tended to be corresponding
increases in action. This evidence validates motivation theory: variations in behavior can
be explained, at least in part, by motivation. In this study, subjects tended to work harder
-that is, respond to more action alerts- as their incentives to join advocacy coalitions
increased. This is an important finding. But as the results of this study revealed, not all
incentives were equally influential.
This study discovered that strategic incentives were the most influential
incentives. By and large, coalition members joined advocacy coalitions to bring about
social change to benefit others, to express important personal values, to achieve broad
goals, and to provide altruistic service for others. In fact, the evidence showed that core
members of the coalitions were motivated especially by strategic incentives. Resource
development incentives were the least influential incentives. Opportunities to advance
their organization, to protest cuts in funding to their organization, to generate revenue for
their organization, or to maximize the flow of money to their organization played a small
role, at best, in decisions to join advocacy coalitions. Moreover, not only did strategic
incentives play the most significant role in decisions to join advocacy coalitions, but
these incentives also correlated most closely with levels of response to action alerts. As
the influence of strategic incentives grew, there tended to be larger corresponding
increases in action as compared to equivalent increases in the influence of resource
development incentives. The contrast is readily apparent. Coalition members primarily
joined to serve, benefit, and achieve broad goals for others; they were not motivated by
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material gains for their organizations. In effect, it appears that strategic incentives served
as the core influence on coalition members. Equally importantly, the motivation to serve
and benefit others was associated comparatively strongly with action. These too are
important discoveries.
However, the study also revealed that incentives to join advocacy coalitions do
not operate in isolation from one another. For instance, while strategic incentives were
the most influential incentives, they did not serve, when taken in isolation, as the firmest
basis for prediction. Rather, the largest amount of variance in action could be accounted
for by simultaneously observing the level of influence ofboth strategic and fellowship
incentives. Furthermore, the results showed that as the influence of one set of incentives
grew, there tended to be corresponding increases in the other incentives as well. This was
particularly true in the case of fellowship incentives. As the influence of either strategic
or resource development incentives grew, there tended to be a relatively large
corresponding increase in fellowship incentives. It appears that as the influence of
motivations to serve and benefit others or to enhance material gains grows, so does the
need to do so among like-minded individuals. Overall, the evidence showed significant
relationships amongst the incentives to join advocacy coalitions. But such
interrelationships were not limited to incentives to join.
The results revealed that the incentives to join advocacy coalitions were
significantly correlated with the incentives to remain. As the influence of incentives to
join grew, there tended to be corresponding increases in the incentives to remain. This
was the case for each of the pairs of incentives: strategic incentives to join correlated
strongly with strategic incentives to remain, and so forth. In fact, the correlation between
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resource development incentives to join and to remain was exceptionally strong. While
these findings showed that the motivation level for joining advocacy coalitions was
significantly related to the motivation level to remain, other, related evidence revealed the
extent to which incentives shifted from joining to remaining. The study found that there
were no significant changes from joining to remaining for either strategic or fellowship
incentives. It was as if the level of influence of these incentives at joining continued to be
the ongoing level of influence. In contrast, however, the results showed a significant shift
in resource development incentives. The level of influence of resource development
incentives was significantly stronger for remaining with advocacy coalitions than for
joining them. It appears that something special was happening to bring about an increase
over time in the strength of resource development incentives. Perhaps coalition members
saw that material rewards were to be gained from their participation in coalition activities
and they increasingly staked a claim on financially beneficial outcomes of action.
However, even the increased influence of resource development incentives still did not
meet the strength of fellowship or strategic incentives. They grew, but they did not
surpass the influence of the other incentives.
The study found a significant relationship between incentives and official duty.
Fellowship incentives to remain members of advocacy coalitions were more influential
among those members who did not have advocacy in their job description as compared to
those members who did. It was as if those members without advocacy in their job
description had a found a community of like-minded individuals with whom to network
and associate. The evidence showed that these members were willing to expand their
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official role beyond service provision, and in doing so the sense of fellowship strongly
influenced their decision to remain with the coalition.
Advocacy Tactics and Action

One exploratory question of this study was to assess the similarities and
differences between advocacy tactics requested in action alerts and the advocacy tactics
conducted by coalition members. The study revealed several important results in this line
of inquiry. First, the evidence implied there were "tried and true" tactics in place in
advocacy coalitions. Tactics such as endorsing circular letters, participating in rallies, and
emailing elected officials stood out as frequently requested and frequently conducted
tactics. However, while some tactics were requested and conducted far less frequently,
the results showed that, broadly speaking, specific tactics were requested, but not
conducted, about one third of the time. No single tactic stood as the one tactic few
members conducted. Conversely, several tactics stood out as very infrequently requested,
including legal action, voter registration, and research. The evidence showed that
coalition members were much more engaged with elected officials than with government
agency directors. This may suggest that advocacy coalitions form to engage elected
officials on behalf of children. In fact, the focus on elected officials matches well with the
strong influence of strategic incentives. Coalition members joined to achieve broad goals
and, as such, directed their attention towards these crafters of broad policy goals. By
contrast, the findings suggested that engagement with government agency directors was
being handled elsewhere, perhaps at the group level with individual public charities
rather than at the coalition level. Additionally, while this study's charity workers heeded
the call to action on behalf of others, it was encouraging to discover that a majority of the
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coalition members had mobilized clients to conduct advocacy on their own behalf.
Finally, the results showed that coalition members responded to about one in three calls
to action, with a majority of members responding to about one in five calls.
In summary, this study found that public charity workers joined child-focused
advocacy coalitions in order to speak and act on behalf of others towards the achievement
of broad goals. These incentives promoted action more than did opportunities for
fellowship or for material rewards. Additionally, the study revealed important differences
in advocacy tactics requested and conducted, most notably that coalition members were
much more engaged with elected officials than with government agency directors.
Coalition leaders should use these findings to enhance their ability to attract and retain
hard-working members. Specific implications of these findings for organizational
practices will be addressed later in this chapter.
Implications for Existing Literature
The results of this study inform the existing literature in a number of valuable
ways. First of all, it drew attention to under-researched segments of society, in particular,
child-focused advocacy coalitions. It responded to the call by De Vita et al. (2001) for
more research on organizations that directed their attention towards children and it added
to the growing body of knowledge on these important advocates for children.
The study also added more empirical evidence to the understanding of motivation
in the context of child-focused advocacy coalitions. For instance, referring to Beck's
(1983) summary ofthe four basic philosophies of motivation in the workplace, the
rational/economic viewpoint was not supported by the evidence. Rather, the results
indicated that motivation is a complex construct with great variability. The findings
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support Barnard's (1938) argument that non-material incentives are more important than
material rewards. It appears, as Barnard asserted, that political organizations would not
be able to survive without the ability to satisfy personal, altruistic ideals, a position
similarly argued by Berry (1977). In contrast, the study provided evidence counter to
Clark and Wilson's (1961) claims that for purposive organizations, such as advocacy
groups, "fewer people are willing to accept organizational purposes than are willing to
accept material or solidary inducement" (p. 151 ). The results revealed that purposive
incentives, such as bringing about social change to benefit others and achieving broad
goals, were far more accepted and influential than material incentives like generating
revenue or maximizing the flow of money.
Next, the results furthered Hula's (1999) argument that coalition members' worklevels are closely correlated with the reasons why the members joined the coalition.
Indeed, the evidence showed that strategic, fellowship, and material incentives were
closely correlated with work-level. Additionally, the results supported Hula's assertion
that the incentives that motivated a group to join a coalition influenced the role the group
played in the coalition: for example, core members were significantly motivated by
strategic incentives. Essentially, the findings successfully extended Hula's work in a
couple of meaningful directions. It appears that Hula's (1999) arguments applied to a
narrower range of behavior, specifically acting upon action alerts, and his model applied
to individuals whose primary role lay outside public policy engagement. Lastly, the
findings enrich the existing literature on advocacy. Previous studies, particularly those
based on IRS documents, failed to capture many advocacy activities. In contrast, this
study revealed a number of important facets of such activities. For example, some
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advocacy activities, such as supporting rallies and endorsing petitions, were far more
frequently undertaken than activities involving legal action or voter registration.
Implications for Organizational Practices
So far, this study has provided evidence for two ofthe main purposes of research:
explanation and prediction. The results have explained the significance of incentives and
their relationship to action. For example, it has been shown that strategic incentives were
the primary incentive to join advocacy coalitions and had the largest positive correlation
with action. The results also lend themselves to prediction. For example, it has been
shown that observing the level of influence of both strategic and fellowship incentives
served as the best predictor of action. However, leaders of advocacy coalitions should
also use these findings for another main purpose of research: the application of
knowledge. It was an important goal of this research to support leaders of child-focused
advocacy coalitions in their efforts to increase organizational capacity and build a
stronger voice for children. With that goal in mind, certain implications for organizational
practices at advocacy coalitions follow.
Because coalition members join for a variety of reasons, leaders of child-focused
advocacy coalitions ought to pay attention to the motivation of their members when they
join. In fact, coalition leaders would do well to pay careful attention to the motivations of
their members, because not all incentives exert equal influence on action. Implementing
systems to record and assess the incentives that motivated new members to join would
aid in the endeavor to predict and control the capacity of advocacy coalitions to engage
policymakers on behalf of children. Assessments of incentives to join could be used to
ensure strong matches between particular coalition members and particular coalition
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activities, thus strengthening organizational capacity. For example, if a coalition member
was strongly motivated by fellowship incentives, perhaps he or she could work on
fostering networks within the coalition. By managing the fulfillment of coalition
members' motivations for joining, coalition leaders might build on the incentives most
likely to fuel action. Furthermore, since the evidence showed that strategic incentives
served as coalition members' core incentives for action, leaders of advocacy coalitions
ought to tum their attention towards nurturing these incentives. Implementing systems to
promote each ofthe coalitions' activities as efforts tied to the achievement ofbroad goals
for the benefit of others would cultivate these essential motivators for core strength and
action. In fact, since the evidence showed that members primarily joined the coalition for
strategic incentives, marketing the coalition as a tool for social change to potential
members could well facilitate recruitment of similarly motivated members.
Additionally, leaders of advocacy coalitions would do well to seek out those
members who are acting outside of their official duties and to provide validation for their
participation, to introduce them to the social networks and norms, and to aid in the
fulfillment of their needs for fellowship. Otherwise, these members may retreat from
public policy engagement. In fact, the nurturing of fellowship incentives, particularly for
peripheral members, could be used as a tool to build solidarity among coalition members
with disparate motivations and interests. As suggested, leaders of advocacy coalitions
should refine their observations and nurture incentives in their attempts to strengthen the
core and increase action, but they must also recognize the potential limits of members to
heed the call. As Subject 239 indicated,
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My org[anization] focuses on health issues. Thus, I can't/won't respond to alerts
about issues on other topics. Not because we don't care, but to preserve our focus
and be disciplined with our limited resources.
Further research is certainly warranted to understand the barriers to action public charities
face, even with the best of intentions to heed the call.
The results also suggest that coalition leaders should continue to request that
members endorse letters and participate in rallies; members tended to perform these
activities readily when asked. Coalition leaders should also continue to direct advocacy
activities towards elected officials; members also tended to perform these functions when
asked. Perhaps practices within coalitions could be developed that build on the strong
match between strategic incentives for joining and advocacy directed at elected officials
with the goal of fostering organizational capacity. Coalition leaders might also consider
directing more advocacy activities towards government agency directors that implement
public policy. Encouraging more action on this point in the public policy process might
facilitate an increase in coalition capacity through those members with close working
relationships with agency directors. Coalition leaders should consider ways to leverage
such relationships to strengthen the voices of children. Finally, perhaps there is
opportunity for increased capacity in the less frequently requested tactics like voter
registration. Experimenting with less frequently requested tactics might uncover untapped
resources and opportunities for public policy engagement.
In conclusion, public charity workers are indeed heeding the call to action on
behalf of children. They are members of advocacy coalitions and they are actively
engaged in public policy from a broad, altruistic standpoint where personal values and
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service for others outweigh material rewards. As Subject 304 concluded on the survey,
"children do not have a voice in our political system and the only way to give (them]
voice is to join with others who care about them." Hopefully, the results of this study
will aid in this important endeavor. However, any changes in organizational practices
certainly warrant consideration of the limited resources at hand and the innumerable
factors not addressed by this study. With sound planning and thoughtful use of this
study's findings, the capacity of child-focused advocacy coalitions could be enhanced,
improving the frequency at which coalition members heed the calls to action, furthering
public policy engagement, and fostering safe, healthy, successful lives for children.
Recommendations
Improvements to this Study

If this research were to be conducted in the future, several recommendations may
be set forth:
1. Since subjects were selected from only four advocacy coalitions, the pool of
potential subjects was somewhat limited for the random selection process. About
20% of the randomly selected potential subjects in this study worked in the same
public charity as other subjects. Involving a larger number of advocacy coalitions
or selecting only one subject per public charity might enhance the diversity of the
results.
2. A larger sample size might improve the ability to detect significant findings,
particularly with regards to the investigations of role, job function, and official
duty.
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3. Survey Questions 4 and 6 could be changed in key ways. First, given that nearly
20% of the subjects wrote in Question 5 that the desire for information was one of
their other reasons for joining the advocacy coalition, adding "information" as an
item on these questions would improve the ability to measure the relative strength
of that oft-cited motivation. Similarly, it might be useful to amend these questions
so that subjects could indicate the relative strength of any of the other reasons
they choose to add.
4. Survey Question 9 could be clarified to indicate its meaning more precisely. To
some subjects "acted on" might have included behaviors other than advocacy
activities. Alternatively, this question could be revised from "acted on" to
"responded to" to create more alignment between the hypotheses and the
operationalization of the variable action.
5. Since many nonprofits workers are volunteers, Question 14 of the survey could be
changed to include volunteers.
6. Since most of the subjects indicated that their organizations' budget size was
more than $1 million, changing Question 15 of the survey to allow for more
precise responses might more accurately capture the data on budget size.
Further Research
Certainly the understanding of motivation and behavior in the context of childfocused advocacy coalitions is open to further examination. The following avenues for
research are recommended:
1. Further research could continue the examination of incentives and their
relationship with levels of response to action alerts. For example, what practices
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are coalitions using to strengthen the core and build fellowship? To what extent
are particular incentives related to conducting particular advocacy tactics?
2. Further research could examine the relationships between action and role, job
function, official duty, and organizational size. Do differences in responsiveness
to calls to action appear on dimensions not examined by this study? Are
combinations of these factors significantly related to heeding the call to action?
3. Further research could examine the shift in incentives. For example, a
longitudinal study might more accurately reveal the influence of incentives over
time. What is happening that facilitates a shift in resource development incentives
but not in strategic or fellowship incentives?
4. Further research could examine the implications of some of the assumptions made
in this study. For example, how, if at all, does organizational sanction for
participation in coalitions impact heeding the call to action? What are the
similarities and differences between personal incentives and organizational
incentives for coalition members?
5. Further research could examine barriers and disincentives to action. For example,
what factors inhibit heeding the call to action? What factors reduce motivation to
heed the call? How do incentives, barriers, and disincentives play out in the
decision-making processes of coalition members?
6. Further research could examine less formalized child-focused advocacy
coalitions. Do this study's findings hold true for coalitions without separate staff,
offices, or identities from their members or coalitions formed under temporary or
ad hoc arrangements?
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
Survey of California Nonprofit Organizations
Thank you for completing this brief survey. Your answers will be kept confidential.
Part 1: This section is about your membership in groups.
1.

Which of the following groups are you a member of? For purposes of this study, "member" is
defined as being on the group's contact list. Check ALL that apply.
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1

[Coalition D]
None of the above

If you selected only one group, skip to question 2, otherwise continue with question l.a. If you selected
none of the above, please return the questionnaire.

l.a. If you selected more than one group above, please answer the remainder of the survey with
reference to the group you consider yourself most active with during the last twelve months.
Please indicate below which one group you've selected to consider when completing the remainder of
the survey. Check only ONE.
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1

[Coalition D]

PLEASE ANSWER THE REMAINING QUESTIONS WITH REFERENCE TO THE GROUP
WITH WHICH YOU ARE MOST ACTIVE.

2.

How long have you been a member of the group you selected in question 1? Check only ONE.
1:1
1:1
1:1
1:1

3.

Less than six months
About six months to one year
About one to three years
More than three years

Which of the following words best characterizes your role in the group you selected in
question 1? Check only ONE.
1:1
1:1
1:1

Core member
Partner
Peripheral
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4.

In the scale below, indicate what reasons initially motivated you to JOIN the group you
selected in question I. In this scale, "Q" means not a reason in your decision to become a member;
"l" means a minor influence on your decision; and ":!" means a significant influence on your
decision.

Reasons for JOINING
Not at all

Level of Influence
Circle ONE number Qer reason
Minor
lllo Significant

Bring about social change to benefit others

0

2

3

4

Advance your organization

0

2

3

4

Associate with like-minded individuals

0

2

3

4

Express important personal values

0

2

3

4

Protest cuts in funding to your organization

0

2

3

4

Network with colleagues

0

2

3

4

Achieve broad goals

0

2

3

4

Generate revenue for your organization

0

2

3

4

Obtain mutual support in personal attitudes

0

2

3

4

Provide altruistic service for others

0

2

3

4

Maximize flow of money to your organization

0

2

3

4

Develop new friendships

0

2

3

4

5.

In the space below, describe what other reasons motivated you to JOIN the group you selected
in question 1? If none, write none.
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6.

In the scale below, indicate what reasons currently motivate you to REMAIN a member of the
group you selected in question 1. In this scale, "Q" means not a reason in your decision to remain
a member; "1" means a minor influence on your decision; and":!" means a significant influence
on your decision.

Reasons for REMAINING
Not at all

Level of Influence
Circle ONE number 12er reason
Minor
Significant

Bring about social change to others

0

2

3

4

Advance your organization

0

2

3

4

Associate with like-minded individuals

0

2

3

4

Express important personal values

0

2

3

4

Protest cuts in funding to your organization

0

2

3

4

Network with colleagues

0

2

3

4

Achieve broad goals

0

2

3

4

Generate revenue for your organization

0

2

3

4

Obtain mutual support in personal attitudes

0

2

3

4

Provide altruistic service for others

0

2

3

4

Maximize flow of money to your organization

0

2

3

4

Develop new friendships

0

2

3

4

7.

In the space below, describe what other reasons currently motivate you to REMAIN a member
of the group you selected in question 1? If none. write none.
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Part II: This section is about "Action Alerts." "Action Alerts" are defined as messages from the
group that urge you to conduct advocacy around a particular issue. Action Alerts may have been
received in any number of ways, including by email, fax, postal mail, phone calls or face-to-face
communication.
8.

9.

About how many Action Alerts did you receive each month over the last twelve months from
the group you selected in question 1? Check only ONE.
0
0
0
0

Once per month or less
Two times per month
Three times per month
Four or more times per month

0

Never. If never, then skip questions 8 and 9 and proceed to question 10.

Using your best guess, complete the following statement:

I've acted on _______ % of the total Action Alerts I received during the last 12
months.
If zero percent. write 0.

10. In the question below, indicate by placing an X if the Action Alerts you received from the group
you selected in question 1 asked you to do the advocacy activity listed anytime during the last
twelve months AND indicate by placing an X whether or not you did the requested action. Do
not consider advocacy activities you conduct in addition to those requested by the Action Alerts.

Activities
(during last 12 months)

Asked to do
Did at least once

TestifY at public hearings
Submit written testimony
Mobilize clients to conduct advocacy
Email elected officials
Mail elected officials
Fax elected officials
Phone elected officials
Meet with elected officials or their staff
Email government agency directors
Mail government agency directors
Fax government agency directors
Phone government agency directors
Meet with government agency directors
Participate in rallies or demonstrations
Endorse circulating letters or petitions
Submit letters to the editor or op-ed pieces
Distribute literature about public policy issues
File suit or engage in other legal action
Conduct voter registration drive
Conduct research or data collection
Conduct public education campaign
Other. SpecifY _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Other. Specify _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Other. Specify _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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Asked to do
Never did

Never asked
to do

Part III: This section is about your organization.
11. Are contributions to your organization tax-deductible? Check only ONE.
0

Yes

o

No

--------.1

ll.a. Which of the following best describes your organization? Check only ONE.
0
0
0
0

Nonprofit for whom contributions are NOT tax-deductible.
Describe ____________________________________
Local, state or federal agency
For-profit
Other. Describe -----------------------------

12. What is your primary job function? Check only ONE.
0
0

o

Provide services to clients
Management
Other. SpecifY _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

13. As you may know, nonprofit organizations are legally permitted to conduct advocacy.
Is advocacy part of your job description? Check only ONE.
0
0

Yes
No

14. About how many paid staff (full-time and part-time) members are employed at your
organization?
If none, write 0.
Number of paid staff members

15. What is your organization's budget for the current year? Check only ONE.
0
0
0
0

Less than $100,000
$101,000 to $500,000
$501,000 to $1 million
More than $1 million

Thank you for your time. Please mail back the completed survey in the supplied envelope. Or, mail to:

Kevin Hickey, 1477 Florida Street San Francisco, CA 94110
If you have questions, contact Kevin Hickey at 415-336-7123 or khickey@usfca.edu. If you would like
a copy of the results, write your name and address on the back flap of the return envelope, and the results
will be sent to you.
I welcome your additional comments. If you have anything else you would like to say, please write your
comments on the back of this page.
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Appendix B
March 15,2004
Name of Recipient, Title
Organization
Address
City, State Zip Code
Dear Name of Recipient:
Hello, my name is Kevin Hickey. I'm a graduate student in the College of Professional Studies at the
University of San Francisco (USF), and I also work at a nonprofit agency providing employment
services to youth with disabilities. For my graduate thesis, I'm conducting a study on public policy
participation of staff from nonprofit organizations. I'm researching why people, like yourself, may
have become involved with public policy on behalf of children, youth and their families. This study is
important because so much of the vital work we do depends on sound public policies. Yet, a great deal
of knowledge remains to be learned from the motives and activities of people like you. I'm asking you
to participate in this research study because I believe your unique experiences will add valuable
insight into the efforts to strengthen the lives of children.
I was given permission to contact you and your contact information by (name of advocacy group), an
organization from which you receive information on public policy matters. They have joined me in
seeking a deeper understanding of the issues that impact the work we do. If you agree to participate in
this study, please complete the enclosed survey and return the survey to me in the provided preaddressed, pre-stamped envelope. This survey will take about ten minutes to complete. To receive a
copy of the results, simply write your name and address on the back flap of the return envelope.
Maintaining your confidentiality is important to me. Although you will not be asked to put your name
on the survey, I will know that you were asked to participate in the study. However, participation may
mean a loss of confidentiality. In order to safeguard your confidentiality, all records will remain
permanently confidential, only I will have access to the coded and locked files. Your identity will not
be revealed in any reports, publications or conversations resulting from the study. Also, your
individual results will not be revealed to (name of advocacy group), nor will they know precisely who
was mailed a survey. While there is no direct benefit to you for participating in the study, the
anticipated benefit of the study is to enhance the understanding of the public policy activities by the
nonprofit community.
Participation in this research is voluntary. While it is unlikely, it is possible that some of the survey
questions may make you feel uncomfortable. You are free to refuse to participate, decline to answer
any question or withdraw at any point without penalties or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise
entitled. While (name of organization) is aware of this study, they do not require you to participate.
There will be no monetary costs to you, nor will you be reimbursed for participating in the study. I ask
only for your time and effort. If you have questions, I can be reached at 415-336-7123 or
khickey@usfca.edu. You're also welcome to contact the USF Institutional Review Board for the
Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at 415-422-6091.
Thank you very much for your time and attention. I hope you join me in my attempt to gain a greater
understanding of our important work. Please complete and return the survey today.
Sincerely,
Kevin Hickey
Graduate Student, Master's of Nonprofit Administration, University of San Francisco
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Appendix C
Dear <Name of Recipient>:
I recently mailed you a survey which asks why
people, like yourself, may have become
involved in public policy on behalf of
children.

PLEASE
PLACE
STAMP

If you've not
p~ease

a~ready done
comp~ete and return

survey today.
Your response will add valuable insight into
the efforts to strengthen the lives of
children.
This survey is undertaken as a requirement
for my Masters in Nonprofit Administration.
I appreciate your time and support.
I£ you

cannot:'~\]#.:inth~our

p~ease contactiine

khickey@us£ca.~,,,:,

Thanks for
Sincerely,

survey,

.i;j 415-336-7123

or

, '

yo~ p}~pt ~tteljti;~.

Kevin Hickey
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Recipient
Organization
Address
City, State Zip

Appendix D
REMINDER
Please complete and return the enclosed survey by Friday, April 9, 2004.
April 2, 2004
Name of Recipient, Title
Organization
Address
City, State Zip Code
Dear N arne of Recipient:
A few weeks ago you should have received a letter from me, accompanied by a survey. As you may
recall, I'm a graduate student at the University of San Francisco (USF). For my thesis, I'm conducting
a study on public policy participation of staff from nonprofit organizations. I'm researching why
people, like yourself, may have become involved with public policy on behalf of children, youth and
their families. This study is important because so much of the vital work we do depends on sound
public policies. Yet, a great deal ofknowledge remains to be learned from the motives and activities
of people like you. I'm asking you to participate in this research study because I believe your unique
experiences will add valuable insight into the efforts to strengthen the lives of children.
I was given permission to contact you and your contact information by (name of advocacy group), an
organization from which you receive information on public policy matters. They have joined me in
seeking a deeper understanding of the issues that impact the work we do. If you agree to participate in
this study, please complete the enclosed survey and return the survey to me in the provided preaddressed, pre-stamped envelope. This survey will take about ten minutes to complete. To receive a
copy of the results, simply write your name and address on the back flap of the return envelope.
Maintaining your confidentiality is important to me. Although you will not be asked to put your name
on the survey, I will know that you were asked to participate in the study. However, participation may
mean a loss of confidentiality. In order to safeguard your confidentiality, all records will remain
permanently confidential, only I will have access to the coded and locked files. Your identity will not
be revealed in any reports, publications or conversations resulting from the study. Also, your
individual results will not be revealed to (name of advocacy group), nor will they know precisely who
was mailed a survey. While there is no direct benefit to you for participating in the study, the
anticipated benefit of the study is to enhance the understanding ofthe public policy activities by the
nonprofit community.
Participation in this research is voluntary. While it is unlikely, it is possible that some of the survey
questions may make you feel uncomfortable. You are free to refuse to participate, decline to answer
any question or withdraw at any point without penalties or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise
entitled. While (name of organization) is aware of this study, they do not require you to participate.
There will be no monetary costs to you, nor will you be reimbursed for participating in the study. I ask
only for your time and effort. If you have questions, I can be reached at 415-336-7123 or
khickey@usfca.edu. You're also welcome to contact the USF Institutional Review Board for the
Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at 415-422-6091.

Please complete and return the survey. Your response is important to me and to the field.
Very Much Obliged,
Kevin Hickey
Graduate Student, Master's of Nonprofit Administration, University of San Francisco
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